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OLIGOPOLY POWER
The development of antitrust law in the United States, now in its sev-
enty-sixth year, has not proceeded at a steady and even pace. Rather, it has
been marked by a limited number of outstandingly creative periods in
which new antitrust concepts and approaches have been shaped by the
courts. At times, the tide has ebbed as well as flowed. But looked at from
the perspective of three-quarters of a century, the tendency of antitrust
law has been to move inexorably toward a more pervasive regulation of
business conduct and market structure. Much of this development would
appear to have resulted from the large advances made in the analysis of the
competitive behavior of the modern corporation and in economic theory.
Beginning with the denunciation in early decisions of flagrant economic
abuse by monopolies and dominant combines, the law of antitrust through
an increasing perception of the various practices that might serve as tools
to undermine free competition moved in the x92o's and 193o's to prevent
or restrict a variety of specific trade practices, including price fixing, group
boycotts, tie-in sales, certain patent restrictions, exclusive dealing, and price
discrimination. The legal vehicle for the most significant antitrust regula-
tion became the per se rule: the denunciation of a particular economic prac-
tice (for example, price fixing) as so likely to be anticompetitive in its
effect as to justify, barring exceptional circumstances, a conclusive presump-
tion of illegality. Such rules made antitrust law both knowable and highly
effective in the areas covered.
Through greater understanding of both corporate behavior and the
market power of one or a combination of firms possessing total or near
total monopoly in a market, the law took a notable step some twenty years
ago in such decisions as United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,' Amer-
ican Tobacco Co. v. United States,' and United States v. Griffith' in recog-
nizing monopoly power itself as being inherently undesirable, irrespective
of any abuse of such power. The mere possession of monopoly power was de-
clared unlawful, where it had been deliberately and knowingly acquired
or purposefully maintained.5 Its use, whether deliberate or not, to gain
advantages in another nonmonopoly market was likewise held to violate
the Sherman Act.' It was even suggested that the use by a monopoly enter-
* A.B. 1949, University of California at Los Angeles; LL.B. 1952, Yale University; LL.M. 1953,
Harvard University. Lecturer in Antitrust Law, University of Southern California. Member of the
California and New York Bars.
1. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
2. 328 U.S. 78, (1946).
3. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
4. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
5. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., iio F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), af'd per cu-
rtam, 347 U.S. 521 (i954).
6. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
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prise of certain kinds of restrictive business practices, which were otherwise
perfectly legitmate, might be illegal.'
Yet even while these advances of the i94o's were heralded under the
banner of the "New Sherman Act," economic theory had identified a new
disease of the competitive economy--oligopoly power, the market power
of jointly acting oligopolists. Existing legal rules were not adequate to deal
with oligopoly power since by definition oligopoly itself was a market con-
dition falling short of monoply and since, as became apparent, oligopoly
power could be exercised without overt agreement. Even the vocabulary
of antitrust failed. Prices were not fixed but "administered." Conditions
of sale were not dictated by a monopoly combine, but set by a "price leader."
Yet the results of oligopoly power could be as destructive of a competitive
market as those caused by the exercise of monopoly power or by other eco-
nomic behavior susceptible to antitrust discipline. Despite the imaginative
suggestions of a few as to how existing doctrine might be utilized to deal
with oligopoly power,8 the observation seemed clearly justified that the
greatest defect of antitrust was its inability to cope with oligopoly power.'
And some even suggested drastic statutory modifications to cure this de-
fect."
Beginning in 1962, however, the Supreme Court began to recognize
explicitly and to come to grips with the problem of oligopoly power. Anti-
trust has not been the same since. It is the thesis of this Article that a body
of law shaped to deal in the first instancewith various types of behavorial
misconduct by businessmen and secondly with a problem of monopoly
power is in the process of adaptation to a much more complicated economic
disorder, oligopoly power-a problem not of economic behavior but of
market structure. As an additional complication, the attempt to deal with
oligopoly power has resulted in, or at least been accompanied by, the identi-
fication of seemingly new categories of anticompetitive behavior, such as
reciprocal buying, conglomerate mergers, and certain aspects of joint ven-
tures. It is hardly surprising that this process of change has caused some
disorder of legal doctrine.
This Article attempts to set forth the economic and legal background
for this convolution of established antitrust concepts, to identify what ap-
pears to be the underlying consistency of the developing legal theory of
oligopoly power, to examine critically the recent decisions of the Supreme
7. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); United States v. Griffith, supra
note 6; United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945). See also
Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 CoLtm. L. REv. 930, 935-36 (1962).
8. See, e.g., Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REv.745 (1949).
9. See J. BMrN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 530-31 (1959); cf. H. PAcKERt, TE STAT OF RE-
SEAncH IN ANTITRUST LAw 83-84 (I963).
I0. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLIcY 46 (1959).
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Court from the standpoint of that developing legal theory, and to make
some tentative suggestions as to the future direction a legal policy aimed
at controlling oligopoly power might reasonably take.
I. REcoGNm oN IN EcoNomic THEORY OF OLIGOPOLY
PowE AS INHERENTLY UNDESRABLE
Preceding the judicial recognition of oligopoly power as an economic
disorder with which an antitrust policy aimed at preserving competition
must come to grips, was the development over a period of thirty years of
the economic theory of oligopoly. To understand the unfolding course of
recent Supreme Court decisions, it is necessary to have some knowledge of
this underlying economic theory and its development.
Oligopoly means, literally, "few sellers"; it has been defined as "the
form of imperfect competition which obtains when sellers are few in
number and any one of them is of such size that an increase or decrease in
his output will appreciably affect the market price."'1 Oligopoly power is
the market power possessed by jointly acting oligopolists. Oligopoly is, of
course, a market condition falling short of monopoly in which a single
firm controls the entire market. It is important to realize that oligopoly
refers to the horizontal structure of the market only.
The modern development of oligopoly theory began with the publica-
tion in 1933 of two works of economic theory, Chamberlin's Theory of
Monopolistic Competition and Robinson's Economics of Imperfect Com-
petition.
The central thesis of these and later studies is that market action by
firms in a market in which there are only a few sellers is fundamentally
different from market action in the classical competitive market of many
sellers, for, as Chamberlin phrased it, where the number of sellers is few
their fortunes are not independent. According to the theory, in a market
of three sellers, one seller cannot significantly increase his market share
without causing a significant decrease in the market shares held by his
competitors, assuming demand for the product is relatively inelastic. The
rational self-interest of sellers with similar cost factors in such a market,
intent upon maximizing their profits, will then lead them to charge identi-
cal prices and sooner or later to arrive at the identical equilibrium price
that will yield the largest return. This price may be, not unnaturally, the
same price that a monopolist intent upon maximizing profits would charge.
The difference under such circumstances between oligopoly and monopoly
pricing becomes the fact that under the oligopoly model several firms share
ii. C. WILcOx, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMEIuCAN INDUsRY 5 (TNEC Monograph No.
21, 1940).
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the monopoly profit, whereas under the monopoly model, all the profit
goes to one firm.
The situation is quite different in a market of many sellers, for economic
theory teaches that there a significant increase in the market share of one
seller will have no appreciable effect on the shares of other sellers. Thus,
in a market of one hundred sellers, a doubling of sales by one seller, if
drawn equally from the other sellers, would reduce their respective shares
by only i/ 99th. This is an insufficient amount, as a matter of rational eco-
nomic self-interest, to compel any competitive response, and hence the
would-be price cutter will not be inhibited in his market action. Other
sellers or new entrants in such a market will also feel free to reduce price if
they determine that they would increase profits by increasing business. As
this process is repeated, price is forced below the monopoly price level. 2
Subsequent economic studies, both theoretical and empirical, tended
on balance to confirm these basic postulates."3 To Chamberlin's analysis
was added the observation that unrestrained competition is not the most
pleasant method of doing business, that it is "costly of nervous energy and
money, and disruptive of friendly relations."'" Hence, psychological as well
as profit considerations were thought to motivate sellers in an oligopoly
market to avoid price competition."
It was also observed that price uniformity in an oligopoly market could
result without any formal, or even informal, agreement. An historical
pattern of price leadership could develop within an industry in which one
seller would become the price leader and the others would be content to
follow a single judgment of the changing market situation in return for
certainty of knowledge as to what their rivals would do. This could be
characterized as "an agreement to agree," but there would be no agreement
in any legal sense with respect to the various price changes, only the uni-
form response of the competitive firms. 6
Such tacit understandings may extend not only to price but to market
shares, or at least customers. Thus, where the number of customers is
limited, there may be an accepted pattern of not attempting to change or
switch individual accounts or customers associated with particular sellers,
a policy of "live and let live."' 7
12. See E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 12-20, 30-55 (8th ed.
x962). See generally G. STOCKING & M. WVATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 85-93 (1951).
13. See BAiN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 266-315; W. FEL.LNER, COMPETITION AMONG rnci FEW
175-91 (1949); F. MAcHLuP, THE EcoNoMIcs OF SELLERs' COMPETITION 347-474 (1952); STocKINso
& WATKINS, op. ct. supra note x2, at 85-iog.
34. MACHLTrp, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 434-35.
15. Much the same thought was voiced by Judge Learned Hand in the first Alcoa case (with re-
spect to monopoly power): "immunity from competition is a narcotic . . . the spur of constant stress
is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone." United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
z6. See MAcHLuP, op. ct. supra note 13, at 443-44. See also BmN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 296-
98.
17. See COmment, 68 YAL L.. 1627, 1641 (1959).
[Vol. x9: Page 285
OLIGOPOLY POWER
As more was learned about the behavior of oligopoly markets, it was
recognized that highly concentrated oligopoly markets tend to be less
competitive than less concentrated ones. A terminology has grown up
which describes the former as a "concentrated" or "tight oligopoly" and
the latter as a "loose oligopoly.' ' 8
A study by Professor Bain has shown a strong positive correlation
between concentrated oligopoly markets and high profits. That study,
covering profits in forty-two manufacturing industries over a five-year
period, indicated that where the largest eight firms in an industry supplied
seventy per cent or more of the industry output, profits much higher than
average resulted. This pattern did not hold in less concentrated oligopoly
markets, thus suggesting that there is a critical point at which a market
becomes sufficiently concentrated to lead to substantial excess profits'
Modern game theory also suggests the existence of a difference between
tight and loose oligopoly markets. Game theory teaches that there is an
enormous difference in the complexity of formulating game strategy as
the number of players increases, and since a three- or four-person game in
an economic setting is already a matter of great complexity, a ten- or twelve-
person game may present so many variables as to defy formulation of a
rational approach." (Of course, the number of separate firms in a market
may be greater than the real number of players, since for various reasons
some firms, particularly small ones, may be counted on to play wholly
passive roles.) This suggests that loose oligopoly markets may behave in a
fundamentally different way than tight oligopoly markets; that is to say,
an "agreement to agree" is impracticable except in tight oligopoly markets
I8. A tight oligopoly is defined as a market in which eight or fewer firms supply 5o% or more
of the market with the largest firm having 20% or more; a loose oligopoly, as a market in which
fewer than twenty firms supply 75% of the market, but no firm supplies more than xo% to 15%.
KAYsEN & TURNER, op. cit. supra note io, at 72.
19. BAIN, op. di. supra note 9, at 421-16. Where, in addition to high seller-concentration, entry
barriers were also high, the profit rate tended to become even more excessive. Id. at 425. Similarly, a
more recent economic study found that both absolute size and the extent of concentration were "[posi-
tively] and significantly related to the variation in profit rates" in 340 of the largest firms in the
economy. Hall & Weiss, Corporate Profits and Size of Firms (unpublished manuscript), cited in Hall,
The Crisis in Antitrust: Reconsidered, io ANrrrusr BULL. 897, 899-900 (1965). But see G. STIGL.R,
CAPITAL AND RATEs OF RETURN IN MANUFACTURING INDUsREs 54-71 (x963). Stigler found no
significant variation in return on investment as between concentrated and unconcentrated industries
during the period 1947-1954. Stigler did find a significant variation in the prewar years 1938-1940;
he would discount a smaller variation in the postwar years 1947-1954, however, on the basis that small
firms have a greater tendency to withdraw profits in the form of excessive salary than large firms,
which are more often found in oligopoly markets. Further, Stigler found that the stability of the rate
of return in a given industry was significantly higher in concentrated than in unconcentrated indus-
tries; at the same time he found a greater variation industry by industry in average rate of return in
concentrated than in unconcentrated industries. Id. at 69-7o. Thus, Stigler's findings would indicate
that those concentrated industries that have achieved high rates of return have been able to maintain
such high rates consistently over the years.
2o. "[A] three-person game is very fundamentally different from a two-person game, a four-
person game from a three-person game, etc. The combinatorial complications of the problem ...in-
crease tremendously with every increase in the number of players . . . . Whenever the number of
players, i.e. of participants in a social economy, increases, the complexity of the economic system
usually increases too; e.g. the number of commodities and services exchanged, processes of production
used, etc." J. VoNs NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEoRY oF Gxsms-s AND EcoNomic BEHAVIOR 23
(3 d ed. 1953). See also MAcsts, op. cit. supra note 13, at 429-30.
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and that loose oligopoly markets may behave in a manner quite similar to
competitive markets.
The problem of oligopolistic interdependence of action, or predictability
of the responses of other firms, will surely be accentuated by the growing
use of highly sophisticated computers to assist in guiding market strategy,
particularly if used by each firm in an oligopoly market.2' It has also been
urged that oligopoly firms are better able to survive credit and monetary
restrictions than other firms are, because of their superior ability to pass
increased borrowing costs on to their customers and their generally greater
access to money markets (though the latter may only be the result of large
size). This proposition has been said to have been demonstrated by the
harsher impact that periods of credit restriction have had on the competitive
industries, agriculture and housing, as compared with the heavy industries
(which are generally oligopolistic).
To be sure, there are economic dissents from this analysis, particularly
as it points to greater regulation of oligopolies, based on the views that not
enough is yet known about oligopoly to justify generalizations of the
type set forth above; that if they are justified in some cases, they are not
justified in all cases; that oligopolists are moved by motives other than profit
maximization; that no predictions of any sort are justified in a market
situation in which the actions of one participant can affect the result; that
oligopoly power of sellers is counterbalanced by the power of large buyers
and other large economic or political forces; that large oligopoly firms
achieve economies of scale and can support widespread research activities
essential for maximum industrial progress in oligopoly markets where
technology is fluid; that oligopoly prevents ruinous competition; and,
finally, that the possibility of oligopoly firm growth with consequent high
profits is a necessary incentive to entrepreneurship, which among other
things makes possible the raising of the enormous quantities of capital
required by modern industry.23 It has been suggested that greater price
rigidity in oligopoly markets may be offset by greater incentive for prod-
uct innovations that cannot readily be matched." A study has also suggested
21. See G. Bucx & TiE EDITORS OF FORTUNE, ThE COMPUTER AGE AND ITs POTENTIAL FOR
MANIAOEMENT (1965).
22. Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 5 Before Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Sen-
ate Committee on the judiciary, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 41-42 (1957) (testimony of John Kenneth Gal-
braith).
23. See G. HALE & R. HALE, MARKET PowERt: SIZE AND Ss'APE UNDER THE SHERmAN AUT 133-
37 (1958); STOCCNjO & WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 12, at 93-99. See also KAYSEN & TuRt.R, op.
cit. supra note so, at 82-86.
24. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HsAv. L. REv. 1313,
1355 (x965). However, Professor Turner cites no economic authority to refute the statement, made
some years earlier in a perceptive comment, that there was no empirical evidence that innovation has
been eithe more or less prevalent in oligopoly industries and that, as a matter of economic analysis,
product innovations where they can (as is frequently the case) be readily matched by other firms
may actually decrease in oligopoly industries for the same reason that price competition declines: the
unwillingness to expend funds on activities that will not expand a firm's market share. Comment, 68
YALE L.J. 1627, x64I-42 (1959).
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that oligopolistic market behavior can be substantially modified if barriers
to entry of new firms into the market are reduced.2
Whatever can be said for the above views, which essentially hold that
it is premature to make a negative judgment concerning oligopoly power,
the weight of economic authority is critical of oligopoly power, at least in
concentrated oligopoly markets.2 As will become clear below, the Supreme
Court has adopted the critical view. The balance of this Article will proceed
on this economic assumption.
II. FAmui OF PAST DEcIsIoNs To DEAL WIi OLIGOPOLY PowER
oR To REcoGN zE IT As EcoNoMcALLY UNDsmArBLE
Until I962 there were virtually no references to the concept of oligopoly
power in the antitrust decisions of the Supreme Court. Legally speaking,
the illness had not been diagnosed. Although many antitrust decisions did
in fact deal with the manifestations of oligopoly power, they did not do so
explicitly. It is not surprising, therefore, that neither oligopoly power nor
the oligopoly structure of a large fraction of American industry was signi-
ficantly altered by antitrust.
The 1955 report of the Attorney General's National Committee To Study
the Antitrust Laws prefaced its discussion of economic concepts, including
oligopoly, with the caveat, "Legal requirements are prescribed by legisla-
tures and courts, not by economic science."2 Since clearly the framers of
the Sherman 2' and Clayton Acts,25 could not have had in mind an oligopoly
theory that did not exist at that time, such views tend to keep the analysis
in antitrust cases within the traditional framework of a simple dichotomy
of monopoly and competition."0
Thus, the bitterly contested Columbia Steel case' was decided under
section I of the Sherman Act without any reference to oligopoly power,
although steel is clearly a highly oligopolistic industry. In determining the
25. J. BArN, BARRIERS TO NEw Com'nTrroN (1956). Market entry barriers, which typically tend
to be high in oligopoly markets, included, in order of importance, product differentiation, economies
of scale, and absolute cost advantages in favor of established firms (such as superior patents). A study
of twenty industries revealed great variation in crucial entry barriers in different industries, however.
See J. BAIN, INDuSrLa ORGANIZATION 239-61 (1959).
26. See KA-sEN & TusRN, op. cit. supra note so, at 25 ("Both economic theory and experience
indicate the likelihood of a monopoly problem in the structurally oligopolistic markets."); Markham,
The Eflectiveness of Clayton Act Section 7, in PERSPECTIVES ON ANTTRusT PoLIcY 364, 187 (Phillips
ed. x965) ("[E]conomic theory argues persuasively that competition is more effective with a dozen
or so sellers than with four or five."); Whitney, The Economic Impact of Antitrust: An Overview,
9 ANTrTRusr BuLL. 509, 53O (1964) ("[M]ost economists writing on antitrust appear to favor a
campaign against oligopoly.").
27. Arr'y GEN. NAT'L Comra. ANTITRUST REP. 316 (1955).
28. x5 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
29. I5 U.S.C. § 12-27 (1964).
30. Such a dichotomy was even reflected in the work of distinguished legal scholars. See, e.g.,
Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception,
22 U. Cm. L. Rav. 157 (1954), which analyzes vertical integration on that basis.
31. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
January 19671
294 ST"iANFOK)D LAW RES VIEJW LVol. 19: Page265
legality of United States Steel's acquisition of the largest independent steel
fabricator on the West Coast, the majority opinion dealt with the issue of
the additional market power that would accrue to United States Steel,
without reference to the oligopolistic market structure in which "Big Steel"
was the leading producer and without attention to the issue of whether
approval of the merger would further accentuate that market structure.
Even the four dissenters focused on the unilateral market power that would
accrue to United States Steel, in protesting that as a result of the merger
the company would be able "to wrap its tentacles tighter around the steel
industry of the West." 2 Although the dissenters spoke of the value of
diffusion of economic power and the danger of its concentration "in the
hands of an industrial oligarchy,""3 there is no reference to the existence
of oligopoly power or the economic mechanisms of an oligopoly market.
In the second Alcoa case" Judge Knox, in carrying out the broad man-
date of the court of appeals to restore competitive conditions in the alumi-
num industry, refused to divide the United States facilities of Alcoa into
two companies. He concluded that a degree of competition already existed,
since Alcoa, which had previously enjoyed a complete monopoly, was now
faced with two competitors (Reynolds and Kaiser) and under the decree
would potentially soon be faced with a third (Aluminum Ltd.). In fact,
the condition of the market to which he referred was one of tight oligopoly.
Indeed, in the first Alcoa case " Judge Learned Hand in his famous
30-60-90 dictum (9o per cent of a market was a clear monopoly, 6o per cent
doubtful, and 30 per cent clearly not)" had in both the 6o- and 3o-per-cent
instances referred to a market that would almost certainly have been
oligopolistic; yet, in an opinion filled with pace-setting ideas, the point was
passed without discussion.
In addition to the lack of explicit recognition of the problems posed by
oligopoly power, the pre-1962 decisions, not surprisingly, did not effectively
deal with it. Cases under section i of the Sherman Act focused on whether
an actual agreement could be proved, whereas economic theory teaches
that one of the characteristics of oligopoly markets is the fact that uniformity
of price and other terms of sale can occur without agreement. The closest
the pre-1962 law ever came to the notion that the price-leadership pattern
apparent in many oligopoly industries might violate the Sherman Act was
in the so-called doctrine of "parallel action"--that the uniform or parallel
action of several firms in setting prices might in and of itself be held to
establish a conspiracy in violation of section i of the Sherman Act. Al-
32. Id. at 537.
33. Id. at 536.
34. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 9i F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
35. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 4x6 (2d Cir. 1945).
36. Id. at 424.
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though controversy raged for a time, the notion was rejected both by courts
and by most commentators."' Oligopoly pricing in and of itself has not
been held illegal under section i of the Sherman Act.
Per se rules that have developed under section i of the Sherman Act,
have been applied with some few exceptions" to both the strong and the
weak, the entrenched oligopoly firm as well as the new competitor seeking
to enter an oligopoly market. Thus, resale price maintenance agreements
have been upheld under section i of the Sherman Act, provided they fol-
lowed the fair trade route, with no consideration of whether such contracts
have been entered into in an oligopolistic or fully competitive market or by
a leading firm or small competitor."
Section 2 of the Sherman Act has also proved ineffective against oli-
gopoly power. Most section 2 cases have dealt with the issue of whether a
single firm had monopoly power in a market. The principal decisions
dealing with oligopoly under section 2 were Tobacco" and United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,1 although neither did so explicitly. Instead, in
each case the Court viewed the problem from the standpoint of monopoly
power, finding a combination or conspiracy among the defendants to
maintain or use such power collectively in the market. Both cases involved
tightly oligopolistic markets, but this fact was not mentioned. There was
hope, nevertheless, from Tobacco, based on the importance given to the
close price leadership maintained by the "big three" in the cigarette in-
dustry, that at last a legal weapon had been forged to deal with the market
power of jointly acting oligopoly firms, 2 but such promise was unful-
filled. 3 In Tobacco there had been other evidence of agreement and the
parallelism was dramatically vivid (involving among other things uniform
price increases, accompanied by enormous earnings, in the midst of a great
depression)." Paramount, perhaps, gave greater support to the concept of
a section 2 violation based on the uniform action of oligopoly firms. In up-
37. See, e.g., Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (x954);
A-r'y GEN. NAT'L CoMm. ANTITRUST REP. 36-42 (1955); Turner, The Definition of Agreement
Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 Hazv. L. REv. 655, 657-84
(1962).
38. See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 557 (E.D. Pa. 396o), aff'd
per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (g6i).
39. See, e.g., Remington Arms Co. v. Gatling, 128 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Pa. X955); Revere Cop-
per & Brass, Inc. v. Economy Sales Co., X27 F. Supp. 739, 742 (D. Conn. 1954). See also Herman,
"Free and Open Competition," 9 STAN. L. REv. 323, 326-30 & nn.28, 29 (x957).
40. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
41. 334 U.S. 131 (948).
42. See A. NA LE, THE ANrrrrr L&ws oF TH U.S.A. X71--72 (196o). See also Rostow, supra
note 8, at 783-85.
43. Thus, notwithstanding the Tobacco case, price leadership continued in the cigarette industry.
As recently as March 21, 1966, a representative of a smaller cigarette producer said of the two largest
cigarette producers (both were defendants in Tobacco), "When one of them does something like
change prices, all we do is wait for the other shoe to drop and follow their lead." Wall Street Journal,
March 21, 3966, at 2, col. 2.
44. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 805-07 (3946).
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holding the district court's findings of conspiracy to fix prices and to
monopolize, the Court commented that it was unnecessary to find an ex-
press agreement in order to hold that there was a conspiracy, for "[i]t is
enough that a concert of action is contemplated and that the defendants
conformed to the arrangement."'45 Although the point is not analyzed in
depth, such a doctrine might proscribe consciously interdependent (but
nonconspiratorial) action of oligopoly firms.
In any event, the hope that an effective weapon had been forged to cope
with oligopoly power was unrealized, for following Tobacco and Para-
mount no significant section 2 cases were decided involving monopolization
by a group of jointly acting oligopolists. Perhaps in part the problem was
the burden of such industrywide proceedings on enforcement agencies with
limited budgetary resources, accentuated by the failure of the doctrine of
parallel action to develop into an effective legal tool that might have simpli-
fied the proof of joint action among oligopoly firms.
Nor has section 3 of the Clayton Act proved effective against oligopoly
power. Although section 3 has been used against vertical arrangements in
oligopoly markets, 6 analysis has for the most part centered on the market
position of the firm entering into the vertical arrangement and the amount
of the total market foreclosed by the particular arrangement in question!'
Virtually no consideration has been given in the cases to the question of
the perpetuation of oligopoly market conditions by vertical arrangements
reachable under the Clayton Act, and only occasional consideration has
been given to the cumulative market effect of the use of such arrangements
by other firms in the market."8
Administration of the Robinson-Patman Acte' has, if anything, shown
an even greater blindness as between the large and the small, even to the
point of probably having hurt the weak more than the strong."
In short, decisions of the courts in antitrust cases prior to 1962 scarcely
disturbed the structure of oligopolistic industries, or for that matter the
overt exercise of oligopoly power, provided careful legal guidance was ob-
tained. With some substantial justification, one legal commentator an-
45. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948). The quoted language
is directed specifically to the price-fixing conspiracy, but the price-fixing conspiracy was also a partial
basis of the conspiracy to monopolize. Id. at 170-71.
46. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (commonly known as Standard
Stations).
47. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365-66 (x963). See also Kessler
& Stern, Competition, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. a (x959). Rereading some of
the leading § 3 cases in the light of oligopoly power theories may show them to have frequently in-
volved oligopoly situations, but such decisions hardly dealt explicitly with oligopoly power problems.
48. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), and FTC v. Motion Picture Adver-
tising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953), have been referred to as cases of collective foreclosure. See
Kessler & Stern, supra note 47, at 28-32, 5x-6o. As with § I of the Sherman Act, the per se rules
developed under § 3 of the Clayton Act have not been oriented particularly toward oligopoly power.
49. X5 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
50. See F. Rowa, PRIcE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE RorNso-PATmANr ACr 551 (i962).
[Vol. i9: Page 285
OLIGOPOLY POWER
swered the question of what saves the coordinated price structure of a
highly oligopolistic industry from illegality as follows:
The answer is technique. The lessons of the cases have been well learned:
there is no "agreement" as to prices; nobody circulates freight rate schedules to
facilitate identical pricing; no trade association executive writes inspirational
editorials urging higher prices and restricted production; official meetings of the
trade are limited in number and follow legally aseptic agenda. Conspiratorial
techniques are unnecessary .. ..
This is not to say that every now and then a rather shocking case of
overt conspiracy may not occur in an oligopoly industry, such as in the
recent Electrical Cases." Indeed, although a concentrated market may make
overt collusion unnecessary for the achievement of price stability, it also
paradoxically increases the facility to engage in outright collusion, since
the smaller the number of firms that need be brought into the conspiracy,
the smaller the risk of detection. For the most part, however, overt con-
spiracies have not been necessary to achieve a coordinated and stable price
structure in highly oligopolistic industries.
Thus, before the recent decisions discussed in this Article, antitrust
policy had been singularly unsuccessful in deterring the development and
maintenance of oligopoly power." In fact the problem had scarcely been
recognized by the courts.
III. THE RECENT DECISIONS OF THE SuPRiE COURT
VIEWED AS AN ATTACK ON OLIGOPOLY PowER
In ten major decisions since I962' the Supreme Court has struck di-
rectly at oligopoly market power, actual or threatened. These decisions
have covered mergers (horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate), joint ven-
tures, and the distribution practice of consignment selling. In each of these
decisions the Court has acted to curb or to prevent the growth of oligop-
olistic market power. In no major decision during this period has it sus-
tained an oligopoly market structure.
A. Incorporation in Recent Decisions of the Economic Theory of Oligopoly
There was perhaps no more striking fact in the Supreme Court's pio-
neering Philadelphia Bank decision " than its reliance upon primary eco-
51. Schwartz, Administered Prices, Oligopoly and the Sherman Act, in SEcTION OF ANTIrrRusr
LAw, ABA, PROCEEDINGS AT THE SPRING MEETING 29 (1958).
52. See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 209 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. x962); Application
of State of California, 195 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
53. See J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 530-31 (1959).
54. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (x962); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (2964);
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377
U.S. 272 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v.
Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (2964); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (965);
United States v. Von's Grocery CO., 384 U.S. 270 (2966); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384
U.S. 546 (x966).
55. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 54.
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nomic authority in shaping a new rule of law for testing the legality of
mergers. Bain, Machlup, and Mason, all economists, have become author-
ities alongside prior judicial precedent and legislative history. The eco-
nomic assumptions of the Court have been based on the current findings
of these and other economists, and a rule of law is required to be more con-
sistent with economic theory than with past precedent.
The extent to which the basic economic theory of oligopoly has become
explicit in the Court's recent decisions is striking. The following short
sketch of oligopoly theory is drawn solely from recent statements of the
Supreme Court. Competition will be most effective in a market in which
there are many sellers, none of which has any significant market share!'
In such a market no single seller or group of sellers acting in concert has
the power to choose its level of profits by giving less or charging more."
Where the number of sellers is limited, however, competition gives way to
parallel policies of mutual advantage." In such a market, prices tend to be
established by administration rather than competition." Small firms may be
content to follow the high prices set by the industry leaders.9 The growth
of oligopoly has an adverse effect upon small business and local control
of industry." The preservation of potential competition becomes particu-
larly vital in oligopolistic markets.62 The Federal Trade Commission has
been even more explicit; and the opinions of Commissioner Elman in
Procter & Gamble Co." and Beatrice Foods Co." show more than a passing
acquaintance with oligopoly theory and many of its primary source works.
Thus, Commissioner Elman concluded in Procter & Gamble that the re-
sults of oligopoly are likely to be an unnaturally high price level, a general
deadening of competition, conscious parallelism, excess capacity, heavy
advertising in lieu of technological innovation, and administered prices."5
B. Analysis of Recent Decisions of the Supreme Court as Attempts
To Control and Limit Oligopoly Power
It is illuminating to analyze these ten decisions in which the Court
comes to grips with oligopoly power. In seven of the decisions, the Court
was dealing with a presently highly concentrated oligopoly market, in two
56. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (2964); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 322 (1963).
57. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176 (1964).
58. Id. at 172; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964).
59. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 22 & n.9 (2964).
6o. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 n.43 (1963).
61. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 333 (i962).
62. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (z964).
63. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16673 (FTC 1963), rev'd, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. x966), cert. granted,
35 U.S.L. WEEK 3136 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2966) (No. 342).
64. 3 TtDE REG. RaP. 26832 (FTC 1965) (appeal pending).
65. 3 TRADE REG. REP. x6673, at 21569 (FTC 1963), rev'd, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966),
cert. granted, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3136 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1966) (No. 342).
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decisions, with a tendency toward oligopoly, and in the tenth, with mul-
tiple markets, in part highly concentrated and in part not. In the following
analysis of these decisions the policy objective of limiting oligopoly power
will be assumed. Among the questions that will be explored are the con-
ceptual consistency of the decisions with oligopoly theory and with each
other, their effectiveness in limiting oligopoly power, and the impact of
other policy values that may impinge on the goal of limiting oligopoly
power.
i. Horizontal mergers.
Since the basic concept of oligopoly is one of horizontal market power,
the initial group of decisions of the Supreme Court in its confrontation
with oligopoly power appropriately concerned horizontal mergers. These
decisions were Brown Shoe, Philadelphia Bank, Alcoa-Rome, Continental
Can, and Lexington Bank. Indeed, so strong appeared the Court's prefer-
ence for viewing mergers from the context of horizontal market power,
that Alcoa-Rome and Continental Can opened the Court to the criticism of
having unduly strained the definition of the relevant line of commerce in
order to force the mergers into horizontal market concepts. More recently
the Court has again been concerned with horizontal mergers in Von's
Grocery and Pabst Brewing, each of which is also open to serious criticism.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States."8 This 1962 decision, the first merger
case to reach the Supreme Court under amended section 7 of the Clayton
Act,"7 was also the first to recognize clearly the inherent undesirability of
oligopoly power. Viewing the i95o amendment to section 7 as designed in
part to prevent the formation of further oligopolies, 8 the Court's invalida-
tion of the merger was based primarily on the finding that it might be a
step in a trend toward oligopoly in the industry involved.
Brown Shoe was both a horizontal and vertical merger, but discussion
(and criticism) of the vertical aspects will be deferred for a separate section
of this Article." The horizontal aspects of the merger appeared in the com-
bination of the retail shoe stores of the two merging companies in the
various relevant markets-defined as separate cities of ioooo or more people.
Although in several of such markets the merger created a firm occupying
a dominant share of the market (twenty to forty per cent), in a number of
cities the postmerger market share was no more than about five per cent.
Nevertheless, given a trend in the shoe industry toward increased concen-
tration by merger, this was a sufficient market share to make the merger
unlawful. Said the Court: "If a merger achieving 5% control were now
66. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
67. x5 U.S.C. § x8 (1964).
68. See 370 U.S. at 333-34.
69. See text accompanying notes 159-65 infra.
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approved, we might be required to approve future merger efforts by
Brown's competitors seeking similar market shares. The oligopoly Con-
gress sought to avoid would then be furthered and it would be difficult to
dissolve the combinations previously approved.""0 The Court then went on
to say that in the fragmented shoe industry control of even a small share
of the market by a "large national chain can adversely affect competition"
and that the Clayton Act was designed not only to protect competition, but
also "viable, small, locally owned businesses" even if it means "occasional
higher costs and prices.""
It is easy to criticize the Court's analysis. It fails to distinguish between
concentrated oligopoly and loose oligopoly, which would have been the
worst that would have happened even if every firm in the industry merged
up to five per cent (as the Court feared might happen). Yet the economic
consequences of concentrated and loose oligopoly clearly differ. Moreover,
protection of small local competitors appears to be viewed as an ultimate
policy goal of equal importance alongside protection of competition and
control of oligopoly power. Such views may amount to economic pro-
tectionism and can be criticized as going far beyond the requirements of
an economic policy aimed at maintaining a competitive market structure. 2
Finally, as will be developed, the Court's opinion is confusing because it
applied an essentially horizontal market concept of oligopoly power to the
vertical aspects of the merger.
Nevertheless, the horizontal-merger aspect of the decision is clearly
correct under oligopoly theory. In several markets a concentrated oligopoly
market problem would have been presented by the creation of a firm with
from twenty to forty per cent of market sales. Even in the markets where
only a five-per-cent firm would have been created, given a merger trend
and the Supreme Court's assumption that other firms might have subse-
quently sought to merge under the five-per-cent umbrella, it seems prefer-
able absent some special showing " to maintain a competitive industry
rather than to permit its conversion into a loose oligopoly. We are, after
all, dealing with the very foundation of oligopoly power: horizontal com-
bination of firms. With a few competitive casualties, some unmatched
product innovations, or simply some voluntary retirements from the mar-
ket, the loose oligopoly of today might well become the concentrated
oligopoly of tomorrow. Even if it be a fact that entry into the market is
easy at the time of the merger, how could a court justify the disappearance
70. 370 U.S. at 343-44.
71. Id. at 344.
72. See Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. Rv. 363, 370-73 (1965).
73. Several mitigating factors were explicitly recognized by the Court: "inadequate resources of
one of the parties that may have prevented it from maintaining its competitive position, ...dem-
onstrated need for combination to enable small companies to enter into a more meaningful competi-
tion with those dominating the relevant markets." 370 U.S. at 346.
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of present competition on any assumption as to probable entry into the
market by new competitors in the future? By what valid reasoning could
a court assume that in view of the swiftly changing nature of business and
of productive technologies the market conditions of today will be similar
to those of tomorrow?
Brown Shoe is also important for giving explicit recognition to the
principle that a small firm seeking to challenge the power of dominant
market leaders may utilize devices forbidden to larger rivals, including
mergers and, in some circumstances, even tie-ins7 This is a principle of
great importance and potential for the development of the legal theory of
oligopoly regulation and control. Thus, the first Supreme Court decision
under amended section 7 of the Clayton Act clearly identified prevention
of the formation of further oligopolies as a target of section 7 enforcement
and of a reorientation of antitrust policy. And the Court exhibited such
sensitivity to the development of oligopoly power that it perceived a trend
toward oligopoly long before the market had approached oligopoly condi-
tions. Despite the controversial features of the decision and some policy bi-
furcation as between protection of competition and protection of competi-
tors, its place in antitrust law appears secure, for with it began the conscious
and explicit attack on oligopoly power.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank."' If Brown Shoe was the
beacon signaling a reorientation of antitrust policy in relation to oligopoly
power, Philadelphia Bank provided the chart for the general course and
direction such a development would take. Philadelphia Bank made clear
that, at least as to horizontal mergers, market structure would be the para-
mount decisional factor. Modern economic theory was brought directly
into judicial policy-making, not gradually but almost suddenly and with
decisive results. At the same time legal rules were shaped with a pragmatic
recognition of the sharp limitations of the judicial system in dealing ra-
tionally with complex issues of economic fact and market behavior.
On its facts Philadelphia Bank was an extreme case of oligopoly, for it
involved a merger creating a large market share in an already highly con-
centrated oligopoly market. The merger would have created a bank having
thirty per cent of the relevant market and a market structure in which the
four largest banks occupied seventy-eight per cent of the market. The ac-
quired bank was in no sense a de minimis market factor, but was a signifi-
cant competitor with a premerger market share of seventeen per cent.
In reaching its conclusion that the merger was illegal under section 7,
the Court drastically simplified the test of illegality for horizontal mergers
involving sizable firms. Taking note of the quagmire into which a judicial
74. See id. at 330.
75. 374 U.S. 3 21 (1963).
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proceeding might fall if a court attempted to assess the probable future
effects of a merger through a full consideration of all the "complex and
illusive" economic data that might be relevant, it laid down a rule of pre-
sumptive illegality.7 A horizontal merger would be presumed illegal if it
"produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant
market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms
in that market ... "" The facts in Philadelphia Bank easily satisfied the
test since the merger would have resulted in the concentration of thirty
per cent or more of the relevant market in a single firm and would have
increased the share of the market held by the largest firms (including the
surviving firm) by roughly one-third.
These facts alone established a prima facie presumption of illegality,
and the burden then shifted to the defendants to present evidence "clearly
showing that the merger is not likely to have . . . anticompetitive ef-
fects." 8 Just how difficult such a showing would be was then made clear
by the Court's brusque treatment of the evidence which defendants had
proffered in their defense. First, the Court rejected the testimony of bank-
ers operating in the local market area that competition among banks was
vigorous and would continue to be so after the merger, for "lay evidence
on so complex an economic-legal problem . . . was entitled to little
weight . . ."" In any event, the Court noted, small firms might flourish
under oligopolistic market conditions by following high prices set by the
dominant firms.8" Second, the Court rejected the concept of "countervail-
ing power"--that is, that anticompetitive effects in one market (the Phila-
delphia area) might be justified by procompetitive effects in another mar-
ket (the regional or national market in which the much larger New York
City banks were included)1
Finally, although this aspect of the decision has probably been weak-
ened by the passage of the Bank Merger Act of 1966,2 the Court refused
even to consider other possible values a merger might promote, such as
Philadelphia's need for a larger bank for future economic development.
The Court thought such a value choice "beyond the ordinary limits of
judicial competence" and in any event irrelevant under amended section
78' The Bank Merger Act may be said to have registered congressional dis-
agreement with the proposition that judges lack competence to consider
76. Id. at 362-63. The quagmire is convincingly detailed in Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act
and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HIv. L. Rlv. 226 (xg6o), upon which the Court openly
relied.
77. 374 U.S. at 363.
78. Ibid.
79. Id. at 367.
8o. Id. at 367 n.43.
81. Id. at 370.
82. x2 U.S.C.A. § i828(c) (Supp. March x966).
83. 374 U.S. at 37 1
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general questions of public interest, at least in the banking area, for that is
precisely what the act authorizes them to do!' However, except as to bank
mergers and perhaps as to certain other mergers in regulated industries,
the second part of the Court's evaluation remains valid-the question of
other possible values promoted by a merger is irrelevant under amended
section 7.
In adopting its rule of presumptive illegality the Court frankly and
without apology relied on the economic theory of oligopoly. Indeed, the
Court defended its rule of presumptive illegality as "fully consonant with
economic theory."85 To be sure, in support of the decision the Court cited
several contract integration cases under section 3 of the Clayton Act,8 but
the relevance of these cases, which deal with vertical contractual arrange-
ments, to a horizontal merger is more assumed than explained.
Economic authorities, not the strained citations to the contract integra-
tion cases, emerge as the dominant support of the decision. Thus, the Court
cites the work of five economists (Stigler, Markham, Machlup, Bain, and
Mason), one economist-lawyer team (Kaysen and Turner), one lawyer-
economist (Bok), and one student comment which takes as its starting
point the economic theory generally developed by those authorities. ' The
significance of reliance on economic authority is worth a moment's re-
flection. Ordinarily the views of economists would be matters of expert
testimony for examination and cross-examination at trial. That the Court
took judicial notice of them necessarily means that the Court considered
such economic views to be clearly a part of accepted knowledge. With the
Philadelphia Bank decision, the position of the volumes on oligopoly
theory became secure on the shelves of antitrust lawyers, and the general
direction of the development of a legal policy aimed at controlling oligop-
oly power was established.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa-Rome)88 and United
States v. Continental Can Co." In the year following Philadelphia Bank
these cases posed three related problems, none of which had been present
in that decision: (i) the merging firms were not in the same industry
but were essentially in distinct but competitive industries;"0 (2) as a
result, definition of the product market was in sharp issue; and (3) al-
84. Courts reviewing bank mergers are authorized to determine de novo whether anticompeti-
tive effects (other than violations of § 2 of the Sherman Act) are "clearly outweighed in the public
interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the com-
munity to be served." 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1828(c) (5) (B), 1828(c)(7)(B) (Supp. March 1966).
85. 374 U.S. at 363.
86. Id. at 365-66, citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), and FTC v.
Motion Picture Advertising Serv. CO., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
87. 374 U.S. at 363 nn.38 & 39, 364 n.41.
88. 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
89. 3 78 U.S. 441 (1964).
9o. "Industry" is used in the same sense as it was in Continental Can. It denotes a group of firms
using similar production facilities to produce markedly similar products. Id. at 444 n.2.
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though the mergers involved leading firms in highly concentrated oligop-
olistic industries, the increased concentration in any definable market re-
sulting from the mergers was relatively slight. Despite these differences
the Court declined to formulate special rules for interindustry mergers, but
in both decisions applied the straight horizontal merger doctrine enunci-
ated in Philadelphia Bank. The result of this was doctrinal confusion, for
in order to achieve the desired legal result in each case under a Philadelphia
Bank approach, it was necessary to force the market definition.
Alcoa-Rome involved the merger of Alcoa, a producer of aluminum
conductor wire, with Rome Cable, ninety per cent of whose production
was in copper wire, which Alcoa did not produce at all. Although, as the
district court had found,9' aluminum and copper wire were competitive
as to at least some uses, the Supreme Court ignored all such interindustry
impacts of the merger. Instead it seized upon the fact that Rome, in addi-
tion to its primary role as a producer of copper wire, was also a small pro-
ducer of aluminum wire. This foothold by Rome in Alcoa's own industry
became the vehicle for the determination of illegality, for it enabled the
Court to focus on the narrow overlap of identical products and to con-
struct the relevant line of commerce at that point. Further, and again con-
trary to the district court's findings, 2 the Court lumped bare and insulated
aluminum wire together as a single line of commerce. "
Continental Can involved the merger of a producer of metal cans with
a producer of glass containers. Neither had any production in the other's
industry, and for the most part they were producing containers for differ-
ent end uses. The Court found that interindustry competition justified
grouping metal cans and glass containers together as a line of commerce.
However, as the Court acknowledged, interindustry competition did not
exist for many end uses, and for other uses there was an available competi-
tive alternative, plastic containers. Only by the market definition actually
adopted was the Court able to reach market percentages approximating
those in Philadelphia Bank.
The market-definition difficulties in these cases can be graphically il-
lustrated by the following tables, which show the percentage market shares
of the merging firms under alternative market definitions. (The market
definition actually used by the Supreme Court in each case is indicated by
italics.) These tables demonstrate that, of the various possibilities open for
reasonable consideration, only the market definition actually adopted by
the Court in each decision could have met the twofold test of Philadelphia
91. 214 F. Supp. 501, 509 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
92. Id. at 5o9-ii.
93. 377 U.S. at 276-77. Even the Government had not asserted that bare and insulated alumi-
num wire were competitive. Id. at 286 (dissenting opinion).
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Table 94
(Alcoa-Rome)
Insulated Combined Bare All Aluminum
Bare Aluminum Aluminum and Insulated and
Wire Wire Aluminum Wire Copper Wire
Alcoa 32.5% I.6% 27.8% 1.8%
Rome 0-3% 4-7% 1"3% 1'4%
Total 32.8% 16.3% 29.1% 3.2%
Table 295
(Continental Can)
Combined
Metal All Containers
Glass and Glass Including
Metal Cans Containers Containers Plastics
Continental 33% 0o 21.9% Not determinable
Hazel-Atlas o% 9.6% 3.1% Not determinable'6
Total 33% 9.6% 25-0%
Bank that a merger is presumptively unlawful if (a) it produces a firm
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market and (b) it
results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that mar-
ket. Thus, in each case it is apparent that only the italicized market defini-
tion would have (a) produced a firm with a market share approaching the
thirty-per-cent market share in Philadelphia Bank and (b) at the same
time indicated an increase in concentration of more than de minimis pro-
portion. Even so, it should be noted that in each instance the increase in
concentration resulting from the merger was significantly less than the
thirty-three-per-cent increase in Philadelphia Bank (only one per cent in
Alcoa-Rome and only five per cent in Continental Can.)"7
94. Id. at 278; 214 F. Supp. at 514.
95. 378 U.S. at 458-61; 217 F. Supp. 761, 776-77,788 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
96. The district court found that the total packaging industry is so vaguely defined and encom-
passes such a broad range of products that it was not feasible to determine market shares. 217 F.
Supp. at 788.
97. 377 U.S. at 28o; 378 U.S. at 461. Increase in concentration was tested in Philadelphia Bank
by computing the percentage increase in the total market share held by the acquiring firm and all
firms larger than the acquired firm. 374 U.S. at 365. In Continental Can the Court referred to the
increase in market share held by the acquiring firm alone (which was 14%). 378 U.S. at 461. Of
course, the latter method of computation will give a higher percentage than the former (in Phila-
delphia Bank, for example, the increase in market share held by the acquiring firm alone would have
been 71%). Although both measures may be of value, the former seems more pertinent to an oli-
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To arrive at its market definitions, the Court had to abandon any care-
ful application or balanced use of the market definition rules laid down in
Brown Shoe (industry or public recognition, peculiar characteristics and
uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensi-
tivity to price changes, and specialized vendors)8 Indeed, the conclusion
seems inescapable that in Alcoa-Rome and Continental Can the market
definition was not so much the prelude to the conclusion of illegality as
the conclusion of illegality was the prelude to the market definition."
Essentially the Court acted in both cases to prevent a dominant firm in a
highly concentrated industry from merging with a substantial firm in a
competing industry (which in Continental Can was also highly concen-
trated) .0
A case could be stated in Alcoa-Rome justifying prohibition of the
Rome acquisition based solely on the disappearance of one of the four
remaining nonintegrated fabricators of aluminum wire with any signifi-
cant share of the market (more than one per cent). This was an acquisi-
tion which the Court viewed as part of a trend of acquisitions of inde-
pendent fabricators by integrated aluminum companies"0' But this con-
sideration was not treated as decisive. Would the Rome acquisition have
been upheld if Rome had produced only copper wire? Or, put another
way, could the illegality have been cured if the aluminum wire production
aspect of Rome's operations had been spun off ?
In fact, the result in both cases seems clearly consistent with a deter-
mined policy of controlling the growth of oligopoly power. In a highly
concentrated industry, competition from substitutes, whether actual or
potential, may well be the most effective limitation on oligopolistic market
behavior within that industry. Significant mergers into a competing in-
dustry by oligopoly firms could well diminish such competition 2 It
would reduce competitive efforts to displace one product with another pro-
duced by the merger partners. What is the point of spending money to
switch a customer from product X to Y if a firm is already selling him X?
As the Court said in Continental Can: "It would make little sense for one
entity within the Continental empire to be busily engaged in persuading
gopoly market structure approach, as it is not the individual power of a firm but the collective power
of the several leading firms in the market that results in the anticompetitive market structure.
98. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (r962).
99. As Professor Pitofsky noted, in Alcoa-Rome the Court relied on a single criterion, distinct
prices, to separate aluminum and copper wire into separate product-markets, while in Continental
Can the Court ignored the fact of distinct prices in combining metal and glass containers into a
single product market. Pitofsky, Trade Regulation-iz964, 2o Bus. LAw. 657, 662 (1965).
loo. In Alcoa-Rome the first four companies in the aluminum conductor field produced 76% of
aluminum wire sold in the United States, and the top nine, 96%. 377 U.S. at 278. In Continental
Can the first three firms in the metal-can industry produced 76% of the industry total, and the first
three firms in the glass-container industry produced 55%. See 378 U.S. at 445-46.
zoi. See 377 U.S. at 278-81.
102. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, at 462-66 (2964).
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the public of metal's superiority over glass for a given end use, while the
other is making plans to increase the Nation's total glass container output
for that same end use."'03
The essential competitive danger found by the Court in an interindus-
try merger of large proportion may be paraphrased in more general terms
as follows: The optimum market strategy of a substantial firm engaged in
the manufacture of both metal and glass containers would be to obtain a
maximum share of the combined metal and glass container market. Most
likely this objective or strategy will lead to a decision to bend the efforts of
the total enterprise toward emphasizing metal containers for certain end
uses and glass containers for others and to abandon efforts to displace glass
containers with metal all across the competitive front. Once one firm had
gained the advantage of being able to employ such a flexible market strat-
egy, further mergers might well be triggered by other companies seeking
to achieve similar competitive advantages. The court held in Continental
Can that a merger involving these possibilities is presumptively illegal
when the acquiring firm is a "dominant firm in a line of commerce in
which market power is already concentrated among a few firms."'04
What Alcoa-Rome and Continental Can seem to add up to is a virtual
prohibition of mergers by market leaders in highly concentrated markets
with firms in competing industries, provided the market definition can, on
some more or less rational basis, be manipulated to show that (i) the merg-
er involves a leading firm in the market, (2) the postmerger share will be
large (roughly twenty-five per cent or more), and (3) the acquired firm
has more than a de minimis share of the market (roughly one per cent).
The handling of interindustry mergers by such a result-oriented market-
definition approach seems undesirable, however, for there may be in-
stances involving a merger by a dominant firm in an industry when even
ingenious minds may be unable to construct a market with sufficiently
large percentages to permit a finding of illegality under the doctrine (for
example, in Alcoa-Rome if Rome had not produced any aluminum con-
ductor). Alternatively, and equally undesirably, the rule of presumptive
illegality may be extended to cover percentage increases in market concen-
tration too small to be of any economic significance-a tendency perhaps
visible in Alcoa-Rome. Such a market-definition approach also fails to
recognize any distinctions in degree of competitive effect that may exist as
between an intraindustry and an interindustry merger' 5 Finally, such an
approach leads to unpredictability, since it can never be clear precisely how
far a court will go in any particular case in shaping a result-oriented mar-
103. Id. at 465.
104. Id. at 464.
io5. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 Hav. L. Rv.
1313, 1374 n.79 (1965).
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ket definition. At the same time, it would not be correct to treat such merg-
ers as pure conglomerates, which they certainly are not.
United States v. Von's Grocery Co.' and United States v. Pabst Brew-
ing Co.' The Court dealt in its most recent horizontal merger decisions
with the problems of (i) mergers in markets not yet highly concentrated
and (2) definition of the geographical market. Although the general di-
rection of antitrust policy remains unchanged by the result in these cases,
each reflects serious defects in legal theory. The Von's Grocery decision is
particularly subject to criticism in that, far from building on the develop-
ing oligopoly doctrine it had previously shaped, the Court regressed to the
use of earlier and cruder concepts.
In Von's Grocery the third largest grocery chain in the Los Angeles
market sought to merge with the sixth largest chain. As a result of the
merger the surviving firm would have become the second largest chain in
Los Angeles with a postmerger market share of 7.5 per cent. The market
was neither a tight nor a loose oligopoly; indeed, there were some 3,818
single-owner stores in existence. Nevertheless, the trend in the market was
clearly toward increased concentration. The eight largest chains had in-
creased their market share in the ten-year period from 1948 to 1958 (up to
and including the merger) from 33.7 per cent to 44 per cent, and the number
of single-owner stores, although still large, had decreased substantially 0
The market was marked by a noticeable degree of turbulence, with exten-
sive entry and exit (sometimes through bankruptcy). There was also some
lack of stability in the identity of the leading firms."9
The Court held the merger to be in violation of section 7 and ordered
divestiture without delay. As far as appears in the majority opinion, how-
ever, the Court's finding of illegality was not based on a careful consider-
ation of the market structure. Instead, the opinion appears to turn on essen-
tially only three factors: (i) the substantial decline in the number of sin-
gle-owner grocery stores; (2) the corresponding rapid growth of chains
(two or more stores under one ownership), in part through merger; and
(3) the merger of "two of the most successful and largest companies in the
area, jointly owning 66 grocery stores ... to become the second largest
chain in Los Angeles."' 0 Based on such an inadequate factual foundation,
the Court's rationale could not avoid an oversimplified and doctrinaire
economic populism. Referring to "the steady erosion of the small inde-
pendent business in our economy," the Court found the retail food market
io6. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
107. 384 U.S. 546 (i966).
xo8. In the eleven-year period from 195o to x961 the number of owners operating single stores
had declined from 5,365 to 3,818, or by 29%. 384 U.S. at 272-73.
1o9. See id. at 288, 291, 294 (dissenting opinion).
i o. Id. at 277.
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of Los Angeles to be "a market characterized by a long and continuous
trend toward fewer and fewer owner-competitors" (although over 3,500
competitors were still engaged). From here, the Court moved in one
large step to its ultimate conclusion that this was the kind of market which
Congress feared "would, slowly but inevitably gravitate from a market of
many small competitors to one dominated by one or a few giants . ... ""'
Ironically, the strong economic protectionism of the Court's opinion
was unnecessary. The actual market concentration figures were not unim-
pressive. Despite the large number of competitors, the retail grocery mar-
ket in Los Angeles was approaching loose oligopoly conditions. Thus, un-
der the Kaysen-Turner definition, the 1958 premerger market shares of 57
per cent for the 20 largest firms and 49 per cent for the 12 largest firms
were not far from the loose oligopoly considered likely to threaten anti-
competitive conditions" 2 A trend toward oligopoly was clearly apparent
in the ten-year period prior to the merger during which the market share
of the 2o largest firms had grown from 44 per cent to 57 per cent and that
of the 12 largest firms from 39 per cent to 49 per cent."
On the basis of these facts Von's Grocery could have been decided, as
Mr. Justice White intimated in his concurring opinion"4 and as the Gov-
ernment brief urged,"5 on the basis of an oligopoly power analysis em-
phasizing the following facts: (i) a pattern of increasing concentration in
food retailing in Los Angeles, which if continued would make this large
and important retail food market structurally oligopolistic; (2) the elimi-
nation of a substantial competitor from that market; (3) a significant per-
centage increase as a result of the merger in the share of the market held
by the market leaders; and (4) the consideration, emphasized in Brown
Shoe," ' that if a merger creating a firm of this dimension (7.5 per cent)
were approved other mergers up to the same percentage would have simi-
larly strong claims for approval." 7
III. Id. at 278.
112. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRusr POLICY 27, 72 (1959).
113. 384 U.S. at 281, 290 (dissenting opinion). Moreover, the recent report of the National Com-
mission on Food Marketing (issued after the Von's Grocery decision) concluded that concentration in
food retailing, as distinct from concentration at other levels of distribution, posed the greatest threat
to competition in food marketing. The commission found that dominant power in food marketing had
passed to food retailers and further that concentration in food retailing markets posed competitive
threats not only at that level, but at other levels of distribution, such as food processing. Large buying
power has enabled the food retailer to demand and get concessions from processors and producers. U.S.
NAT'L COa'N ON FOOD MRETING, Foon FROM FARMER TO CONSUMER 72-75, 94, 96, 1o6 (1966).
This aspect of the Von's merger was not referred to by the Court.
114. 384 U.S. at 280.
X15. Brief for Appellant 20-39. The entire Government brief bristles with oligopoly market
analysis, which makes the Court's apparent deliberate avoidance of the approach all the more dis-
couraging.
x16. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,343-44 (x962).
117. A correct approach under oligopoly theory would also have resulted from adoption of the
test suggested in the Government's brief. The Government urged application of a rule of presumptive
illegality as to horizontal mergers in relatively unconcentrated markets where the merger "(I) occurs
in a market where there is a significant tendency in the direction of undue concentration and (2)
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Under such an oligopoly concentration approach the many persuasive
defenses offered (among others, ease of new entry, absence of oligopoly
pricing patterns, lack of absentee ownership, and lack of stability in relative
ranking of leading firms) 1.8 could have been rejected on the ground that
present evidence of market competitiveness is no basis for permitting con-
version of a market into an oligopoly. Present competitiveness provides no
guarantee of future competitiveness under more concentrated market con-
ditions.
The rationale of Von's Grocery represents a setback in the development
of a consistent theory of oligopoly power. The excessive preoccupation by
the Court with the continued existence of competitors in large numbers
improperly moves the focus of antitrust policy from the maintenance of
conditions of competition (here a structurally competitive market) to the
preservation of competitors for their own sake, irrespective of economic
efficiencies. Although in this instance the result is not altered by such an
approach, in other cases the principle could work large mischief.
The danger is reflected in language in the opinion in which the grounds
for recognition of possible procompetitive aspects of mergers appear to be
drastically narrowed. Citing Brown Shoe, the Court stated that the Von's
merger could not be justified on the basis "that the two had to merge to
save themselves from destruction by some larger and more powerful com-
petitior.""' 9 The narrow reading given Brown Shoe is made clear by refer-
ence to the cited portion of that decision. For what the Supreme Court said
there was that while section 7 prohibited demonstrably anticompetitive
mergers, it did not bar mergers between two smaller companies to enable
them "to compete more effectively with larger corporations dominating
the relevant market."'12
0
The apparent narrowing of the test permitting mergers between small
companies to those instances where it can be established that the merger
is necessary to "save themselves from destruction" is most undesirable. Such
cases will be rare, and the possibility of being able to present effective proof
even rarer. As a result, mergers which might promote competitive vigor
appreciably increases the existing level of concentration." Brief for Appellant x8, United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (x966).
i18. These defenses are well stated in a stinging dissent by Justices Stewart and Harlan, stressing
among other things the failure of the Court to consider (i) the level of existing economic concen-
tration in the market, (2) the ease of new entry and the turbulence of both entry and exit from the
market, (3) substantial changes over a ten-year period in the identity of the twenty largest firms in
the market, (4) the increase in the number of chains (as distinct from single-owner stores), (5) the
strong market-extension aspects of the merger (caused by the fact that the stores in the two merging
chains were generally some distance apart), (6) the absence of any factor of absentee ownership
which would result from the merger, (7) the lack of any showing of oligopolistic pricing patterns or
other diminution of competition, and (8) the ability of small stores to compete with chains through
membership in large cooperative buying organizations. See 384 U.S. at 281-99.
x 19. Id. at 277.
2o. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962).
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in a market while not appreciably increasing its oligopoly concentration
would be blocked.
Banning all mergers which decrease the number of competitors in an
industry in which the absolute number of competitors is already decreasing
would make a fetish of the antimerger law, unnecessarily freeze in the ad-
vantages of existing market leaders, and lead to needless economic rigidity.
On the facts of the case, such an extreme reading of Von's Grocery is not
necessary, and sound analysis should preclude it.
The decision in United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.'2' is principally de-
fective in its cavalier approach to the problem of market definition. The
case involved the merger of the Pabst and Blatz brewing companies, the
tenth and eighteenth largest brewers, respectively, in the United States. As
a result of the merger, Pabst (the surviving firm) would obtain the follow-
ing shares of each of three possible geographical markets: (I) 4-5 per cent
of the United States market, where Pabst would become the fifth largest
firm; (2) 11.3 per cent of the three-state market of Wisconsin, Illinois, and
Michigan; and (3) 24 per cent of the Wisconsin market, where Pabst
would become the largest firm.'
None of the three possible markets could be called competitive in struc-
ture. The national market was probably a loose oligopoly, or at least very
close to one,.2 . and the two more localized markets approached tight oli-
gopoly' 4 In all markets the number of competitors was declining and con-
centration increasing, although apparently not as a result of merger.' In
whichever of the three ways the market might be defined, the merging
firms were engaged in substantial competition.2 6
The district court dismissed the complaint at the close of the Govern-
ment's case, holding, among other things, that the only relevant market
was the national market' 7 The Supreme Court, reversing and remanding,
found the evidence sufficient to establish a violation of section 7 in each of
the three geographical markets. In so holding, the six-man majority 8
failed to deal adequately with the problem of market definition, or even
to recognize its importance. The Court explained that the relevant geo-
graphical market was not to be proved "in the same way the corpus delicti
121. 384 U.S. 546 (x966).
122. Id. at 552.
123. In x961 the 25 largest brewers had 77% of the total national market, and the io largest
had 53%. Id. at 552; United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. 475, 490 (E.D. Wis. 1964)
(lower court opinion).
124. In 2962 the eight largest brewers had 68% of the three-state market, and the four largest
brewers had 59% of the Wisconsin market 384 U.S. at 551
125. See id. at 550-52. There was apparently no evidence introduced at trial to show a history
of past mergers in the industry.
126. Id. at 551.
127. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Wis. 2964).
128. Four of the nine Justices filed concurring opinions, but Mr. Justice Douglas made it clear
that he was fully in accord with the majority opinion. 384 U.S. at 553.
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must be proved to establish a crime," or "by metes and bounds as a surveyor
would lay off a plot of ground." Nor, said the Court, did the Government
have the burden of proving "by an army of expert witnesses what consti-
tutes a relevant 'economic' or 'geographic' market."'129
Following these overstatements, with which few would quarrel in their
exaggerated form, is this somewhat amazing statement: 'Troof of the sec-
tion of the country where the anticompetitive effect exists is entirely sub-
sidiary to the crucial question in this and every § 7 case which is whether
a merger may substantially lessen competition anywhere in the United
States."' 30 Wisely, the Court does not attempt to explain how it can be
demonstrated on any intellectual basis that a merger lessens competition
except with respect to some definite area of competitive interaction.'8' In
two concurring opinions, Justices Harlan and Stewart and Mr. Justice For-
tas took exception to the majority's market-definition approach and urged
careful definition of the market in the light of a full factual record' 2
As in the Von's Grocery decision, the controversial sweep of the Court's
opinion in Pabst Brewing was quite unnecessary. As Justices Harlan and
Stewart made clear in their concurring opinion, there was ample evidence
in the record to develop a meaningful geographical market based on a
standard of effective competition ("an area in which the parties ... com-
pete, and around which there exist economic barriers that significantly im-
pede the entry of new competitors")#' Although the Pabst Brewing ma-
jority was correct in rejecting the simplified test proposed by the Govern-
ment for defining the geographical market,' it was both unnecessary and
unwise to indicate that market definition could be simplified without any
standard at all. The entire approach of market-concentration analysis as a
tool by which to regulate oligopoly power rests on the determination of a
real market, or area of effective competition, in which such concentration
X29. Id. at 549.
130. Id. at 549-50.
131. See notes 291-309 in/ra and accompanying text.
The Court properly rejected the special defense that, in assessing the validity of a merger, a
trend toward concentration in an industry is not to be considered unless it is the result of past mergers.
If excessive market concentration is the evil, it seems entirely correct to state, as did the Court,
that "a trend toward concentration . . . whatever its cause, is a highly relevant factor" in determin-
ing the anticompetitive effects of a merger. 384 U.S. at 552-53. In one sense a substantial merger in
an industry tending toward concentration by means other than merger may be particularly dangerous,
since in such an industry strict antitrust policy cannot be relied on to arrest the trend toward con-
centration. Under these circumstances the need may be even more acute to retain whatever compe-
tition exists by blocking mergers.
132. Id. at 555, 561. Thus, Mr. justice Fortas stated that "[u]nless both the product and the geo-
graphical market are carefully defined, neither analysis nor result in antitrust is likely to be of ac-
ceptable quality." Id. at 562.
133. Id. at 556-57.
134. The Government urged that the existence of a geographical market be presumed on a
prima facie basis if (i) sellers included in the market are in actual competition and (2) sellers not
included in the market suffer from "some" disadvantage in competing with those included. Brief for
Appellant 15-16, 32-35. Although it will be suggested that the test not be adopted, it is vastly
preferable to no test at all-the result that emerges from the Pabst Brewing case. See notes 30i-o4
infra and accompanying text.
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is of significance. Perhaps Pabst Brewing is the logical consequence of the
market-definition analysis begun in Alcoa-Rome and Continental Can, but
that fact does not make it more acceptable. Market definition has clearly
become the least satisfactory area of current merger decisions.
In their reasoning, although not in result, both Von's Grocery and
Pabst Brewing pose a threat to the development of a consistent and mean-
ingful legal policy toward control of oligopoly power. Both also carry
some risk of evoking, sooner or later, a congressional reaction toward doc-
trines of antitrust law not resting on an adequate structure of economic
and legal theory.
2. Mergers and other horizontal arrangements under the
Sherman Act.
In light of the thinking of the Supreme Court in the decisions dis-
cussed, the result in the Lexington Bank merger case 3" seems hardly ex-
ceptional despite the fact that it arose under the Sherman Act rather than
the Clayton Act. If Lexington Bank has importance, it is in the possibility
that it reflects a modification of the long-standing rule of reason under sec-
tion i of the Sherman Act. The decision could arguably be interpreted as
modifying the rule of reason when large oligopoly firms are involved in a
horizontal arrangement or agreement outside the area of per se violations.
The Court held that a horizontal merger was illegal under section i of
the Sherman Act where the merging firms were the first and fourth banks
in the market, holding, respectively, forty per cent and thirteen per cent
of commercial banking assets in such market, and where there were only
four other competitive banks. Although the Court did not say so, this was
a major merger which would have created a dominant firm nearly three
times the size of its nearest competitor in a highly concentrated oligopoly
market in what the Court considered to be a particularly sensitive
business"
The decision would have surprised no one if the case had arisen under
the Clayton Act rather than the Sherman Act. But the fact that the case
was decided under section i of the Sherman Act, which normally requires
proof of an actual restraint of trade and not a mere probability of comped-
tive injury and the fact that the Court seemed to dispense with such proof
and to apply a presumption of illegality evoked two dissents and two spe-
cial concurrencesY3 Instead of undertaking an elaborate market analysis
of the effects of the merger, as had been done in United States v. Columbia
135. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
136. See id. at 668-69; United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963).
137. Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented; Justices Brennan and White concurred in the result
but not the reasoning of the Court. 376 U.S. at 673.
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Steel Co.,1 8 the leading Sherman Act merger decision up to that time, the
Court announced the following rule: "Where . . . the merging companies
are major competitive factors in a relevant market, the elimination of sig-
nificant competition between them constitutes a violation of § i of the
Sherman Act."'89
Phrasing a legal test in terms of "major competitive factors" in a market
comes very close to announcing a special test applicable to concentrated
oligopoly markets. Lexington Bank itself, as well as the precedents cited
by the Court,""° clearly involved concentrated oligopoly markets. Inde-
pendently of such precedents the words "major competitive factor" in a
market can hardly refer to a firm with less than twenty per cent of the
market. 4' The merger of two major competitors, each holding fifteen to
twenty per cent of a market, would result in a combined percentage of at
least thirty to forty per cent of the market. In almost all cases a concen-
trated oligopoly market would be involved or created since it is unlikely
that two firms would have achieved such large shares without some de-
gree of general market concentration. Indeed, they would be close to pos-
sessing oligopoly power by themselves'
With respect to horizontal mergers only, it seems no great step, given
the current shape of the Court's thinking and the development of economic
theory, to hold that a merger which creates or substantially intensifies a
concentrated oligopolistic market condition is, without more, illegal, even
under section i of the Sherman Act. Perhaps, this is all the decision means.
If so, and if the author's rephrasing is correct, the decision does not seem
as controversial as might otherwise appear.
The important question posed but not answered by Lexington Bank is
whether other types of arrangements, agreements, or joint business under-
standings between major companies in concentrated oligopoly markets not
amounting to per se violations may be subject to such a simplified test of
illegality under section i." It would be easy to become alarmed about such
a prospect and to let imagination run out of hand. However, the problem
138. 334 U.s. 495, 527 (1948).
139. 376 U.S. at 672-73.
140. The Court cited the four so-called railroad cases. 376 U.S. at 67o-71. As Mr. Justice Har-
lan pointed out, three of these cases "involved the combination of massive transportation systems"
and the fourth "a combination of 'two great competing interstate carriers and . . . two great com-
peting coal companies ... .' "Id. at 675 (dissenting opinion).
141. A firm with a smaller percentage, say 5% or io%, would be but a minor competitive fac-
tor in most tight oligopoly markets where the market leaders would be likely to have far more for-
midable percentages. On the other hand, in the case where a firm with 5%o or xo% of the market
might be large relative to other firms, the proper conclusion, certainly in terms of economic theory,
would be that no firm is a major competitive factor in the market since no firm could significantly
affect the market solely through its own action.
142. See note 18 supra.
143. The broad relevance of the railroad cases cited by the Court, see note 140 supra, to "the
legality of many types of contracts, ownership arrangements or business policies not within the reach
of Section 3 or Section 7 of the Clayton Act" has been suggested before. ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L Comr.
ANTITRUsT REP. 24-25 & n.83 (1955).
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dissolves if there is imposed the simple precondition, which seems implicit
in Lexington Bank, that such arrangements will be proscribed only if they
can be shown to contribute directly and materially to the growth or main-
tenance of concentrated oligopoly power in a definable market.
When that precondition is imposed, it becomes hard to envision just
where the Lexington Bank rule would have practical application outside
areas already covered by either per se rules or the Clayton Act. Apart from
the field of mergers, where it is close to redundant, the rule seems no more
than a doctrine for potential use against some arrangement or agreed
method of common operation by oligopoly firms which is not now in
violation of law and which can be proved to be closely connected with
the achievement or maintenance of oligopoly power. Perhaps on balance
the case is an aberration, but if so, all the more does it reflect the deep-
seated antipathy of a majority of the Court to concentrated oligopoly
markets.
3. Vertical mergers.
The relationship of oligopoly market power to vertical merger is funda-
mentally different from its relationship to horizontal merger. A horizontal
merger directly enhances the power of the oligopoly firms by adding to
their market shares and thereby further concentrating the market. A ver-
tical merger, however, adds nothing to horizontal market shares. At most,
it may affect competition at the horizontal level, but it can increase, as well
as decrease, competition. - Thus, on the one hand, vertical integration
may diminish competition by serving as a vehicle for protecting market
power or transferring it from one stage of production to another;" '4 it may
facilitate both price and nonprice discrimination, including the use of
leverage against nonintegrated suppliers or customers of the integrated
firm ("price squeeze") ;16 it may accentuate product differentiation, which
has been identified as among the most serious barriers to entry;.. it may
diminish competitive confrontation at various stages of integrated opera-
tions by replacing buying and selling in an open market with dosed intra-
firm transactions not subject to competitive market discipline.. and there-
by reduce the number of open-market transactions through which final
prices to consumers are determined;... finally, it may seriously increase the
144. See KA'sEN & TtnuNER, op. cit. supra note 112, at x9--27. See generally G. HALE & R.
HALE, MARKET POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER TnE SHEaPaiu, ACT 222-39 (1958); Adelman, Inte-
gration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HArv. L. REv. 27 (1949); Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sher-
man Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 157 (i954).
145. KAYSEN & TURNER, Op. cit. supra note 112, at 121-23; Adelman, supra note 144, at 43.
146. KAYsEN & Ti rER, op. cit. supra note x12, at 122; Adelman, supra note 144, at 45-46.
147. J. BA N, BARRIERS To NEW COMPETITION 216-17 (1956).
148. HALE & HALE, op. dt supra note 144, at 236-37.
149. Markham, The Effectiveness of Clayton Act Section 7, in PERSPECTIVES OF ANTrrauST PoL-
icy i8o (Phillips ed. 1965).
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amount of capital and know-how needed to enter the integrated marketY"
On the other hand, vertical integration may promote competition. It
may be the gateway to the achievement of greater economic efficiencies;...
it may serve as a means of bypassing monopoly (or oligopoly) stages of
production and thereby avoid the paying of a monopoly toll;. 2 and vertical
integration by one firm in an oligopoly market may provide a means for
that firm to frustrate concerted action by its competitors by enabling it to
initiate hard-to-detect price cutting at another, more competitive stage of
production.'
Although it has been denounced from time to time, vertical integration
has never been illegal per se under either the Sherman or Clayton Acts.
Until Brown Shoe, vertical integration was scrutinized in Sherman Act
cases primarily to determine whether it would promote monopoly
power," ' and that approach was reflected also in the work of many legal
scholars.' In Clayton Act cases the question was whether competitors
were likely to be foreclosed from a substantial share of the relevant mar-
ket.' In both types of cases the question of the relationship between the
vertical integration and the actual or probable oligopoly structure of the
market was generally ignored. Thus, for example, in United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc.,... the fact that leading firms in a highly oligop-
olistic production-distribution market had integrated forward to control
three-quarters of the first-run theaters in cities with populations of over
ioo,ooo was not necessarily illegal under the Sherman Act; the question of
legality turned on whether the existence of monopoly power could be
shown (together with the required intent or purpose to use such power),
or alternatively whether vertical integration was "a calculated scheme...
to restrain or suppress competition.' 58
The first efforts of the Supreme Court to deal explicitly with the rela-
tionship between vertical mergers and oligopoly power were in Brown
Shoe." At least by way of hindsight, the Court's treatment appears rudi-
mentary and falls short of the sophistication the problem demands. The
x5o. KAYsEN & TnuNER, op. cit. supra note 112, at 120.
151. Hearings on the Impact Upon Small Business of Dual Distribution and Related Vertical
Integration Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Select Committee on Small Business, 88th
Cong., ist Sess., vol. x, at 5o-5i (2963) (testimony of Jesse W. Markham); HALE & HALE, op. cit.
supra note 144, at 235-36.
X52. Adelman, supra note 144, at 47; Bork, supra note 144, at 200.
153. Dean & Gustus, Vertical Integration and Section 7, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 672, 690, 707-O8
(1965).
154. See United States v. Columbia Steel CO, 334 U.S. 495 (1948); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. X3X, 173-74 (1948).
155. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 244 (an economist, but also a "legal scholar"); Bork, supra
note 144.
156. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & C., 353 U.S. 586, 605-07 (1957); ATr'v
GEN. NAT'L CoM m. ANTITRUST REP. 122 (1955).
157. 334 U.S. 131 (I948).
I58. See id. at 167, 172-74.
159. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (z962).
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vertical aspects of the Brown Shoe merger appeared in the acquisition by
Brown, a shoe manufacturer, of Kinney's retail outlets. There was not
actual or even near oligopoly in either market. Brown, although the fourth
largest shoe manufacturer, possessed only four per cent of total shoe manu-
facturing facilities in a market with hundreds of competitors, while Kin-
ney's retail outlets comprised a mere 1.2 per cent of total shoe stores in an
unconcentrated market 60
Despite these facts, the Court held the vertical aspects of the merger
likely to injure competition. The Court said that, given the existence of a
trend in the shoe industry toward vertical integration and a tendency for
the acquiring manufacturing firm to become an increasingly important
source of supply for its acquired retail outlets, "the necessary corollary ...
is the foreclosure of independent manufacturers from markets otherwise
open to them." It then makes no difference, said the Court, that the indus-
try is fragmented, as was the shoe industry, or that the industry remains
"dynamically competitive," for "remaining vigor cannot immunize a
merger if the trend in that industry is toward oligopoly."' 61
In short, the Court began with the premise that vertical integration
which causes a trend toward oligopoly is illegal. It then proceeded to find
a trend toward oligopoly in the unconcentrated shoe industry, based solely
on (i) a trend toward vertical integration and (2) a tendency following
acquisition of retail shoe outlets for the acquiring shoe manufacturers to
deal with their acquired outlets.
The Court's premise as to the general unlawfulness of vertical integra-
tion that promotes the growth of oligopoly power appears sound. There is
little reason to prefer the growth of oligopoly power obtained by means of
vertical mergers to the growth of such power by horizontal mergers. To
be sure, there may be productive and distributive efficiencies achievable
through vertical integration, but horizontal integration may also achieve
efficiencies through economies of scale. In either event, the achievement of
efficiencies not otherwise obtainable could be made a special defense to a
general rule or presumption of illegality.
It is the Court's reasoning from its premise, however, that appears
faulty. In every true vertical merger designed to achieve efficiencies through
integration, it is to be expected that the merging companies will deal with
each other on an increasing basis. This is, and must be, the very motive of
such a vertical merger. Thus, Brown Shoe comes dangerously close to
equating a trend toward vertical integration with a trend toward oligopoly
itself. Quite simply, Brown Shoe fails to focus on the underlying economic
assumption that excessive horizontal concentration is the basic vice and
x6o. Id. at 297, 300-03.
x61. Id. at 332-33.
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therefore that vertical integration by merger becomes important in foster-
ing oligopoly conditions only to the extent it can be shown to contribute to
the growth or maintenance of horizontal market power.
It is one thing to condemn in its incipiency a direct trend toward oli-
gopoly clearly demonstrated by increased market concentration resulting
from a series of horizontal mergers. It is quite another to condemn vertical
mergers which, in and of themselves, add nothing to oligopoly concentra-
tion in any market, solely on the basis of speculation as to their effect on
future patterns of trade. The anticompetitive inference becomes very weak
when all the markets involved are unconcentrated and when no visible
threat of near oligopoly is present in any market. Even the resulting "fore-
closure of independent manufacturers" referred to in Brown Shoe is not
necessarily a trend toward oligopoly. Independent manufacturers may find
other market outlets. They may even be able to undersell the integrating
firms if the latter have unwisely judged the economies resulting from
integration. The independent manufacturers may themselves integrate.
That some competitors may fall by the wayside because of efficiencies
gained by their rivals through general vertical integration does not neces-
sarily mean that the market will become an oligopoly at any level. The
market may remain structurally competitive, although having fewer com-
petitors-a natural, and perhaps under some circumstances a desirable, re-
sult that should be fully expected from time to time under the dynamics of
competition and changing economic conditions.
In short, the economic case has not been presented that would justify a
sacrifice of all the possible efficiencies and benefits that vertical mergers can
bring through interchange of technology and ideas because of a fear that
a trend toward vertical mergers in an unconcentrated market may lead to
horizontal concentration at some unknown future date.
To proscribe vertical mergers generally in nonconcentrated markets
would be to impose a drastic limitation on business experimentation. It
would be opposed to what may be the most basic premise of our antitrust
laws: that free initiative and experiment in business endeavor is the surest
road to our national economic welfare and that antitrust should preserve
insofar as possible market conditions in which such free experimentation
can take place. An undiscriminating policy against vertical mergers might
even turn out to be less desirable than a policy against pure conglomerates.
In the case of a vertical merger there is a far greater chance that a manage-
ment theory of how to achieve greater efficiencies or technical progress is
being tested than in the case of a conglomerate merger, which in many
instances reflects only a desire to diversify capital investment.
Vertical mergers involving large firms in concentrated markets or
clearly threatening to create excessive concentration are a different matter.
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Although in a particular case there may be justification for such a merger,
either because it achieves otherwise unreachable efficiencies or is in fact pro-
competitive, a general presumption against mergers of this type seems
reasonable. When firms in a concentrated oligopoly market integrate ver-
tically with the result that they become major factors in a vertically related
market, the most natural result is to project the oligopoly consensus in
their own market forward into the new market. As in the case of vertical
integration where there is monopoly power, price competition is prevented
from "backing up and infecting earlier markets."1 '
Because of the pessimistic, but too often verified, notion that excessive
power, if possessed, is likely to be used, the general conclusion can be
drawn that vertical integration in such circumstances also increases the
probability of the other anticompetitive practices and conditions described
above 0  The long congressional investigation of "dual distribution,"
which explored the relationship between vertically integrated firms and
their nonintegrated customers and competitors, tends also to confirm the
conclusion that excessive market power possessed by vertically integrated
oligopolies carries a risk of detrimental competitive effect. A subcommittee
report thus concludes that while vertical integration and dual distribution
were not in and of themselves undesirable, "when detrimental effects have
occurred, dual distribution has been coupled with either predatory conduct
or substantial market power."'0 4 That is to say, apart from overt, predatory
acts, the danger to competition resulting from dual distribution occurred
in those cases where the vertically integrated firm had a strong oligopoly
position as a supplier to the customer with whom it was also engaged in
competition at a lower level of distribution. Moreover, as the market be-
comes more concentrated and the number of firms decreases, the anti-
competitive conditions arising from vertical integration (prize squeeze on
nonintegrated firms, price discrimination against customers selling in in-
elastic markets, and increased capital requirements for entry) tend to have
even greater adverse impact and significance"
4. Consignment selling and restraints on marketing and distribution.
Consignment selling is a method of resale price maintenance, which
in turn is one of several types of restraints on marketing and distribution.
In recent Supreme Court decisions it is possible to see the beginnings of a
162. Adelman, supra note 144, at 46.
163. See text accompanying notes 145-50 supra.
x64. Subcommittee No. 4, House Select Comm. on Small Business, The Impact Upon Small
Business of Dual Distribution and Related Vertical Integration, H.RL REP. No. 1943, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 103 (2964). As Professor Walter Adams colorfully testified with respect to abuses against
independent steel fabricators by integrated steel companies: "The root of the problem is the Brob-
dingnagian size and power of the vertically integrated steel trust." Id. at 65.
165. See Hearings on Small Business, supra note 151, vol. 2, at 50-51, 55 (testimony of Jesse W.
Markham); C. KAYsEN & D. TuNa.R, Asrn-usr PoLicY 120-23 (2959).
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legal policy aimed at controlling the use.of such restraints where an oli-
gopolistic industry is involved. Even as late as i96o the Court, in invali-
dating a resale price maintenance system involving an oligopolistic indus-
try, made no reference to any relationship between resale price mainte-
nance and oligopoly power.68 However only three years later, Mr. Justice
Brennan, concurring in White Motor Co. v. United States, noted that
resale price maintenance is intended to, and "almost invariably does in
fact, reduce price competition not only among sellers of the affected prod-
uct, but quite as much between that product and competing brands."'67
In this connection, Mr. Justice Brennan also referred to a Harvard Law
Review note which stated that resale price maintenance has a "settled pro-
pensity ... to carry an oligopolistic price structure down from the man-
ufacturer's level into the chain of distribution . ... 168
Then came Simpson v. Union Oil Co.' in which, for the first time
with relation to the facts of an actual case, the connection was made
(although not explained) between resale price maintenance and oligopoly
power. Prior to Simpson an effective method of nationwide resale price
maintenance existed in the form of consignment agreements (provided
the manufacturer was willing to assume the legal burdens of the con-
signor-consignee relationship).' In Simpson the Supreme Court over-
turned this long-standing rule in the context of a highly concentrated oli-
gopoly market, seemingly in a conscious effort to control oligopoly power
further.
At issue in Simpson were the consignment agreements of a large oil
company which fixed the price at which some 3,300 consignee service
stations in eight western states sold gasoline 11 The concentrated oligopoly
structure of the oil company's market is hinted at in the opinion, which
refers to "a vast gasoline distribution system" which is "able to impose
noncompetitive prices on thousands of persons," and to the consignment
"device" used as "a wooden formula for administering prices on a vast
scale."1 2 The term "administered prices" is an expression typically used
to describe the price structure of concentrated oligopoly, and it seems clear
166. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (ig6o). A discussion of the relationship
might have assisted the rationale of the decision, which has been criticized as defective. See Levi, The
Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on Resale Price Maintenance, g6o SUPREME COURT REv. 258.
x67. 372 U.S. 253, 268 (2963).
168. Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HAzv. L. REv. 795,
8o (1962).
269. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
170. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). The rule of this case had been
accepted and relied on by distinguished antitrust practitioners. See Stewart, Exclusive Franchises and
Territorial Confinement of Distributors, SEcTioN oF ANTITRusT LAW, ABA, PRocE.DINOS TBE
SPING MEETING 33, 39-40 (1963).
171. 377 U.S. 14-15 & n.i.
172. Id. at 21-22.
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that the Court was using the terms in that sense" The Court appears to
have placed considerable reliance for its understanding of consignment
agreements "in the gasoline field" on congressional hearings in which a
Union Oil official testified, in effect, that Union Oil in establishing its
price was following other price leaders." In fact, the market was clearly a
tight oligopoly. In California, the largest state included in the geographical
market, eight companies produced ninety-five per cent of the gasoline sold
in 1964, and the four leading firms (of which Union Oil was one) pro-
duced sixty-five per centY5 Probably the reason that the Court did not
specifically refer to the concentrated oligopoly characteristics of the market
was simply that the briefs (based on a stipulated record) did not contain
the information. 7"
I would suggest, therefore, that Simpson indicates that resale price
maintenance through consignment contracts is illegal per se when used
by a sizable firm in a concentrated oligopoly market whether or not the
firm's competitors use the device and whether or not its own consignees
are in competition with each other' From the point of view of regulation
of oligopoly power, this rule seems clearly justified. Where the manu-
facturer's market is one of tight oligopoly and therefore is likely to be
marked by an absence of price competition, but where the product is dis-
tributed through numerous relatively small dealers and outlets, there is
always the chance that unpredictable price cutting at wholesale and retail
levels, possibly accompanied by dealer pressure for price concessions, can
unsettle the price uniformity at the manufacturing level' 8 In addition,
even though competition may be blocked at the manufacturing level, some
competitive benefits may accrue at the retail level in the form of lower
173. See id. at 22. With reference to administered prices the Court quotes at length from an
article by Professor A. A. Berle, which discusses "administered prices" as established by "[t]he three
or four 'bigs' in any particular line," briefly describes the price mechanism of concentrated oligopoly
markets, and then specifically refers to the automobile market (a classic tight oligopoly). See Berle,
Bigness: Curse or Opportunity?, N.Y. Tunes, Feb. 18, x962, § 6 (Magazine), at 18, 55, 58 (quoted
in 377 U.S. at 22 n.9).
174. 377 U.S. at 79-2i. The official had testified, "Now, we go out into the market area and
find out what the competitive major price is, what the level is, and we set our house-brand at that."
Hearings on Distribution Practices in the Petroleum Industry Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the
House Select Committee on Small Business, 85 th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 3, at 79-80 (1957).
175. Los Angeles Times, Feb. 22, x965, pt. III (Financial), at 9, col. 5. A similar pattern of
concentration was considered at an earlier date in the Standard Stations decision. At that time seven
leading companies produced 65% of the gasoline sold in seven western states. Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295 (1949).
176. The briefs indicated only that Union had io% of the service stations on the West Coast
and sold 11.5% of all gasoline sold through service stations in California. Brief for Respondent x7,
26; Brief for Petitioners 74.
177. But see Rahl, The Demise of Vertical Price Fixing Through Consignment Arrangements:
The Simpson Case, in 29 A.B.A. Awrrrausv Sc'rsox 216, 237 (1965). I would disagree with Pro-
fessor Rahl's suggestion (as applied to oligopoly markets) that resale price maintenance as to con-
signees not in competition with each other may be permissible despite Simpson. It would be a rare
situation, however, in which a firm of oligopoly size would have consignees who were not to some
extent in competition.
178. See Adelman, supra note 144, at 46; Herman, A Note on Fair Trade, 65 YALE L.J. 23, 24
n.5 (x955).
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prices or other advantages for consumers. If the distributors and retailers
are setting their own price, the manufacturer cannot cause them to follow
a prevailing oligopoly price even though he would like them to do so. On
the other hand, if each manufacturer can ensure a uniform price at each
level of distribution, the oligopoly market consensus can be maintained at
every step in distribution.
Where only some of the firms in a tight oligopoly market engage in
resale price maintenance, there is less contribution to the maintenance of
oligopoly conditions in the manufacturer's market. Nevertheless, to the
extent that some retail distributors are prohibited from initiating price
cuts, the retail market may become less competitive. It would appear
reasonable to assume that a manufacturer engaging in resale price mainte-
nance will not ordinarily wish to initiate price cutting at the retail level.
The previously discussed testimony of the Union Oil official showing that
Union Oil caused its consignees to follow the prevailing market price is
consistent with this supposition 9
What are the other implications of Simpson in the context of the grow-
ing doctrine aimed at controlling oligopoly power? First, in the area of
resale price maintenance, it is possible that the Supreme Court may even-
tually hold that fair trade, the only remaining effective method of resale
price maintenance, cannot be used by manufacturers in highly concen-
trated oligopoly markets. This could be done by giving content to the so
far almost meaningless statutory prerequisite in the McGuire Act that fair
traded goods be "in free and open competition with commodities of the
same general class produced or distributed by others."'80 The Court could
hold, without doing violence to the statutory language, that goods pro-
duced by firms in highly concentrated oligopoly markets are simply not in
free and open competition, in contrast to the goods produced by firms in
less concentrated markets 8' Many of the economic and legal authorities
previously referred to in this Article concerning the noncompetitive char-
acteristics of oligopoly markets could be marshaled. It would not be a
giant step; such an interpretation has already been applied to preclude
monopoly firms from utilizing fair trade for the precise reason that the
goods they produce are not in free and open competition.8 2
Beyond resale price maintenance, Simpson, or at any rate the present
179. See note 174 supra.
I8O. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2) (1964).
181. But see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Home Util. Co., 234 F.2d 766, 770 (4 th Cir. 1956) (the
court dismissed this argument as "a clear non sequitur"); Herman, "Free and Open Competition,"
9 STAN. L. REV. 323,329-32 (1957).
182. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828
(1947). Moreover, the Supreme Court has said that the resale price maintenance exemption is to be
narrowly construed since "resale price maintenance is a privilege restrictive of a free economy."
United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 36 (1956).
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trend of Supreme Court decisions, may have implications with respect to
other contractual restraints on marketing and distributing, including ex-
clusive dealing, territorial restrictions, and customer limitations. These
arrangements may also contribute to maintaining anticompetitive rigidity
at various levels in concentrated markets. Collectively, and even individ-
ually, such arrangements may operate to reduce the number of competitors
at each level of distribution. They give manufacturers in oligopoly markets
the power, through joint but noncollusive action, to establish in the chan-
nels of distribution the same market structure that prevails in the manu-
facturing market. If such a structure is one of concentrated oligopoly, it
will raise competitive risks at whatever level of distribution it occursY 8
Exclusive arrangements, like vertical integration, tend to make entrance
into consumer-goods manufacturing more difficult, for the new entrant
must build up a new distributor network in order to market his product
or else integrate forward into distribution at large expense 4 Exclusive
outlets also appear to be important in building up high degrees of product
differentiation in the public mind. Such differentiation, as previously indi-
cated, has been identified as among the most important barriers to entry of
new firms. 85
At the same time, exclusive dealing and territorial and customer re-
strictions tend to reduce the power of the distributor in relation to the
manufacturer. If the distributor handles only the manufacturer's products
and is cut off, he may be put out of business. In a concentrated market it
may be extremely difficult to obtain a new distributorship line. By limiting
each distributor to a particular territory and perhaps also to particular
183. Professor Bork challenges such an analysis, labeling it a mere "truism." In Bork's view,
jointly acting oligopolists cannot further injure consumer interests by vertical restraints since, assuming
they are already extracting a full oligopoly return in the first market, they would have no incentive
or even market ability to extract a higher net return as result of restrictions imposed in the second
market since by assumption, they are already charging the optimum oligopoly price to ultimate con-
sumers. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75
YAz L.J. 373, 45-z6 (1966). A student author has suggested that thrusting oligopolistic structure
into lower levels of distribution is possible only if all manufacturers divide the market into substan-
tially the same territories. Even then the distributors, being subject to pressures other than those from
manufacturers, might not act like oligopolists. Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the
Sherman Act, 75 HAav. L. REv. 795, 834 (x962).
The very essence of oligopoly behavior is interdependent response, and dearly such response
gains in both predictability and uniformity if the oligopolistic manufacturing firms themselves con-
trol the price and handling of their product through the channels of distribution. Similarly, absence
of such vertical control may well inhibit oligopolists from taking their maximum net return from
distributors, and thus there may be something more to be extracted from the market by vertical re-
straints. In addition, vertical restraints tend to raise entry barriers (particularly through product dif-
ferentiation) and thereby to add stability to oligopoly markets; the result is to permit a higher price
to be charged without attracting new entry. See also notes x84-89 infra and accompanying text.
184. The policy similarities between vertical integration by contract and vertical integration by
merger are thoroughly explored in Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration,
69 YALx L.J. 1 (x959). See also Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Ar-
rangements Under the Clayton Act, g6i SuPREmE CourT REv. 267; Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted
Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws, 9 U.C.LA.L. REv. III (1962).
185. See J. BAIN, BARRERs TO Naw CoaMarrsoN 217 (1956).
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classes of customers, the national manufacturer, among other things, en-
sures as far as possible that no one distributor will become indispensable.
This serves to prevent the growth of a distributor with enough "counter-
vailing power" to negotiate in any effective sense with a manufacturer con-
cerning price or other terms of distribution.
On the other hand, distributorship restrictions can have procompetitive
effects even in concentrated oligopoly markets. As the Supreme Court
noted in White Motor Co. v. United States, they may be the "only prac-
ticable means a small company has for breaking into or staying in busi-
ness,"' 86 a policy consideration that may possibly justify even a tying con.
tract. 8 They may guarantee a small firm an assured source of supply'
There may also be problems inherent in marketing the product requiring,
or at least making it desirable, that distributorship restrictions be imposed
-for example, risks in introducing a new product or service of a complex
machine.'89
It is appropriate to conclude, then, that the treatment of these restric-
tions should be selective: severe when employed by substantial firms in
concentrated markets and more lenient when used by smaller firms, par-
ticularly where they are new market entrants or are attempting to chal-
lenge market leaders in concentrated markets. Indeed such a distinction
has recently been increasingly recognized by the lower courts and the com-
mentators.' Such a selective policy might be criticized on the basis that it
could provoke large firms into forward integration, thereby ending the
independence of many small distributors throughout the country and
eliminating intrabrand competition in the products of the forward-inte-
grating firm.' But a determined antitrust policy could probably forestall
such a development. Vertical acquisitions by market leaders in concen-
trated oligopoly markets of existing distributors or their assets could be
blocked under section 7 of the Clayton Act.'92 Thus, a manufacturer would
have to be prepared to open his own distribution system without the benefit
of acquiring existing outlets. A number of factors would appear to militate
x86. 372 U.S. 253, 263 (2963).
187. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (2962) (dictum).
188. Seeibid.
189. See Address by FTC Commissioner Philip Elman, First Annual Antitrust Institute, printed
in 5 TR.ADE Rao. REP. 5o28 (Nov. 5, x965) (control of resale price may be required for the de-
velopment of a firm's marketing and advertising strategy).
x9o. See Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964) (closed territories); United States
v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., x87 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. x96o), afl'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567
(1961) (use of tying device); Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question in the
Sherman Act, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 286 (1963); Note, 75 HFAv. L. REV. 795, 834 (1962).
x91. See Jordan, supra note 184, at 152-53.
192. See text accompanying notes 144-65 supra. Where distributors are not incorporated, § 7
would not be literally applicable, but § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(2964), has been held applicable to such situations. Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TitaDa REG. RaEP. 27244,
at2 2355 (FTC 1965).
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against such an undertaking by a manufacturer who has built up a net-
work of independent distributors. There appear to be many valid business
reasons why manufacturers often prefer to be represented by independent
local merchants rather than by company-owned outlets 9 ' Nor would it be
an easy task simply to terminate relationships with an entire network of
distributors located throughout the country in favor of company-owned
outlets. Litigation, dislocation of distribution, ill will, and perhaps other
problems would be the likely result. In short, an established, successful
marketing arrangement tends to have a certain amount of built-in inertia.
The trend of both current Supreme Court decision and economic analy-
sis then appears to indicate the appropriateness of extending the policy of
oligopoly control to the areas of distributorship arrangements. The exten-
sion should be accompanied, however, by recognition that the connection
between the questioned practices and horizontal oligopoly is indirect and
often complex.
5. Reciprocity and the conglomerate merger.
In FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.94 the Supreme Court faced for
the first time the legality under section 7 of a true conglomerate merger. A
key factor in the Court's decision invalidating the merger was its determi-
nation that the merger tended to solidify and protect the market share of a
leading firm in a highly concentrated oligopoly market. The acquired firm
(Gentry, Inc.), a manufacturer of dehydrated onion and garlic, held ap-
proximately thirty-two per cent of the relevant market; the degree of oli-
gopoly concentration was measured by the fact that Gentry and its one
leading competitor together held almost ninety per cent of the market1 5
The acquiring firm (Consolidated Foods), a diversified processor and
seller of food products, was in no sense a competitor of the acquired firm;
nor were the two in the vertical relationship of buyer and seller.
In sustaining the finding of illegality, the Court agreed that the merger
would strengthen the hold of Gentry in the dehydrated onion and garlic
market because of the leverage the affiliation with Consolidated would
give the merged firm over food processors who were both suppliers to
Consolidated and customers or potential customers of Gentry, as can be
shown graphically in the following diagram:
193. The reasons include the desire to use capital for other purposes, dislike of assuming local
credit risks as well as state and local tax liabilities, and the sales superiority of a self-employed dis-
tributor over a salaried employee of a manufacturing outlet. See Note, 75 HAIv. L. REV. 795, 834
(x962).
194. 380 U.S. 592 (x965), reversing 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964), reversing T.ADE R G. REP.
x6182 (FTC 3962).
195. Id. at 595.
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Consolidated's patronage as a buyer from food-processor middle firms
could be used as a lever to induce them to buy from Gentry, or in the lan-
guage of antitrust, to engage in the practice of reciprocity. The result of
facilitating the practice of reciprocity, the Court said would be that "the
two-firm oligopoly structure of the industry is strengthened and solidified
and new entry by others is discouraged.""'1'
It must be recognized that there are by definition at least two markets
in which an injury to competition can occur in a reciprocal buying rela-
tionship. Thus, in Consolidated Foods the quid pro quo inducing the mid-
dle firms to buy their onion and garlic from the Gentry division of the
merged firm was the continued (or increased) ability of the same middle
firms to sell the processed foods which they produced to the Consolidated
division. An injury to competition, therefore, could occur in the market in
which the middle firm buys (onions and garlic) or the market in which it
sells (processed food). The Supreme Court focused on the first of these
two markets in its decision and referred to the possible foreclosure of Gen-
try's competitors as a result of reciprocal buying pressures on middle firms.
However, it seems equally apparent that there could also be foreclosure of
competitors of a favored middle firm, who might find themselves unable
to sell to Consolidated. This possibility is especially apparent where, for
example, competitive middle firms are not sufficiently diversified to need
Gentry's products or are already committed to one of Gentry's competitors
under a long-term supply contract.
Concentrating on the market in which the middle firm bought, the
Court began with the assumption that reciprocity made possible by merger
"is one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the antitrust
laws are aimed.'' 7 It stated that an FTC finding that a merger will result
in probable reciprocal buying is not to be upset if the acquired company
"commands a substantial share of a market" and if there is substantial
evidence to support the finding."' 8 The Court did not stop to say, or sug-
x96. Id. at 6ox (quoting the FTC opinion).
197. Id. at 594. Most commentators condemn reciprocity. See Hale & Hale, Reciprocity Under
the Antitrust Laws: A Comment, 113 U. PA. L. Rav. 69, 73-74 (x964); Hausman, Reciprocal Deal-
ing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HAEV. L. REv. 873, 879-80 (1964); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers
and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HtAv. L. REv. 1313, 1390-91 (x965).
198. 380 U.S. at 6oo.
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gest, what "substantial share of a market" meant other than that it was
more than de minimis.00 The single most decisive factor in Consolidated
Foods clearly appears to be the tight oligopoly structure of the acquired
firm's (Gentry's) market. The FTC opinion had analyzed reciprocity in
some detail, analogizing it to tying contracts, to abuses of large buying
power as in United States v. Griffith..0 and to vertical foreclosure of com-
petitive suppliers."' Making no reference to these portions of the Commis-
sion's decision, however, the Court referred almost entirely to that part of
the opinion discussing the merger from the viewpoint of the oligopoly
problem."'
Consolidated Foods thus indicates that in those mergers involving reci-
procity a crucial inquiry will be whether the expected reciprocal buying
will have an appreciable effect on the maintenance of oligopoly conditions
in the industry or industries involved. It is possible that under certain con-
ditions there may be no such effect, as where other firms are similarly
diversified and can make equally effective demands on their supplier-cus-
tomers.0 3 The issue, however, appears clear: whether the merger will be
likely to maintain, intensify, or create oligopoly conditions in the relevant
market.
Such an inquiry rests on the assumption that there is an important rela-
tionship between oligopoly conditions and reciprocity. This assumption
appears to be well supported by economic theory. To begin with, reci-
procity, which stated simply is the use of buying power to promote sales,
is not likely to be an important force except in buying markets which are
oligopolistic. Buyers will not be able to exert pressure on their suppliers
unless the market to which these suppliers sell is not fully competitive, and,
therefore, a supplier is not able readily to replace a buyer attempting to
exert leverage, by selling to others at the same or a slightly shaded price.
Thus, if Consolidated had been a small chain of local food markets, no dif-
ferent from hundreds of other small chains, it would be most unlikely that
it could have exerted any leverage over the food-processor middle firms to
change their buying patterns. Other characteristics of markets susceptible
to reciprocity influence are lack of symmetry in the size and diversification
of firms, existence of unused short-run capacity in the suppliers' market-
raising the threat of serious price retaliation by a supplier's competitors if
he cuts price rather than bow to reciprocal buying pressures, and predomi-
x99. Ibid.
200. 334 U.S. ioo, io8 (1948).
201. Consolidated Foods Corp., TADE REo. Kin,. 6182 at 20977 (FTC 2962).
202. See 18o U.S. at 597-6o i.
203. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 H.A.v. L. REv.
I323, 1336-88 (1965).
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nance of sales to industrial firms and large distributors rather than to ulti-
mate consumers."' These conditions are most likely to be present in oligop-
olistic buying markets, and particularly in highly concentrated oligopoly
markets.
Second, the existence of reciprocal buying contributes to further market
imperfections since the practice of reciprocity facilitates the further growth
of the large and diversified firms at the expense of their smaller and less
diversified competitors.2 5 Alternatively, the smaller and less diversified
firms are stimulated to become larger and more diversified, probably by
following the merger route (often the cheapest and certainly the fastest
way to grow).20'
Finally, reciprocal buying practices may discourage new entry into the
market since the potential entrant may well conclude that his market suc-
cess will not be determined by his own competitive efforts in terms of the
price and quality of his product, but that he will be blocked by established
reciprocal buying patterns.2"' For these and other reasons there is justifica-
tion for concluding that reciprocity promotes and encourages industrial
concentration."'
If the above analysis is sound, reciprocity seems destined to play a key
role in the development of conglomerate-merger law. This conclusion is
supported by Professor Turner's severe criticism of the practice in his recent
article on-conglomerate mergers and his recommendation of a stringent
test of illegality."' The result of such a development could well be a strong
bias in favor of forcing legal analysis of conglomerate mergers into the
reciprocity category. Such a tendency should be resisted, however, as it is
likely to lead to the same kind of confusion and opaque reasoning which
marked the failure in Alcoa-Rome and Continental Can to come to grips
with the interindustry merger as a distinct problem.
In any event, it appears to be clear from Consolidated Foods that no
merger involving the substantial probability of reciprocal buying in a con-
centrated oligopoly market is likely to pass muster under section 7. The
principal questions left open are (i) whether the Court in its ambiguous
dictum concerning the added weight to be given to the FTC's determina-
204. Stocking & Mueller, Business Reciprocity and the Size of Firms, 30 J. Bus. 73, 75-77
(i957); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HAtav. L. REv. i313,
1387-88 (1965). A further condition leading to reciprocity is a sloping demand curve for individual
firms in industries where marginal costs are constant over a wide range of output. Stocking & Muel-
ler, supra, at 75-77.
205. Stocking & Mueller, supra note 204, at 93-94.
2o6. The FTC noted this possibility in the Consolidated Foods case: "Other diversified food
firms may follow Consolidated's lead and seek to acquire the remaining industry members for reci-
procity purposes. This development would stifle fair competition on an industry wide basis." TRADE
RUG. REP. 16182, at 20980 n.7 (FTC x962).
207. Hausman, supra note 197, at 879-80.
208. Ibid.
209. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. Rav.
1313, 1386-93 (i965).
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tion of expected anticompetitive results where the acquired company
"commands a substantial share of a market' 210 has adopted an effec-
tive presumption of illegality (absolute or conditional) as to mergers in
concentrated oligopoly markets; (2) if so, whether the presumption may
eventually apply to loose oligopoly or even nonoligopoly markets; (3)
where the presumption does apply, what minimum market share will have
to be subject to potential reciprocal buying pressures (and, therefore, to
market foreclosure) before the presumption comes into effect;21 and (4)
whether the potential market foreclosure will be measured not only at the
supplier level but also at the middle-firm level2 1
There is a major policy consideration involved in formulating any
strict rule against conglomerate mergers raising the possibility of reci-
procity. Such a rule tends to freeze in the existing advantages of large
diversified firms over their smaller rivals. However, this consideration ap-
plies with equal force elsewhere in merger law and in antitrust generally.
A more permissive antitrust policy as to smaller firms might do much to
correct such disparity. The long-range solution no doubt lies in the cor-
rection of the market imperfections that contribute to the practice of reci-
procity and that the practice of reciprocity contributes to maintaining.1 '
In short, antitrust policy as to mergers involving reciprocity should be a
part of a general policy of controlling oligopoly power.
6. Joint ventures.
A joint venture, like a merger, is the joining together of two distinct
business entities in a common business endeavor. Unlike a merger, how-
ever, a joint venture does not eliminate one of the partners but results in
the creation of a new producing business organization 4 The relationship
between the formation of a joint venture and oligopoly power appears
quite complicated. Unless the new venture enters the market of one of the
parents, there is no increase in concentration in any market, but in fact a-
direct and immediate decrease in concentration in the market entered. The
unfavorable effects, if any, are all indirect, involving the removal of
potential competition or some other risk to future competition. Yet clearly,
210. 380 U.S. at 6oo.
211. The figure i5-2o% has been suggested. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 78 HAuv. L. Rv. 1313, 1391 (1965). Such a percentage almost surely indicates
an acquisition of a firm in at least a loose oligopoly market.
212. Turner suggests that the problem of market foreclosure at the middle level is "more specu-
lative and more remote" than at the supplier level because the customers of the middle firms (such
as Consolidated) would have a strong incentive to preserve competition among their suppliers, and
therefore might refrain from unduly favoring only a few firms. Id. at 1388 n.94.
213. See Hale & Hale, Reciprocity Under the Antitrust Laws: A Comment, 113 U. PA. L. Ray.69, 75-76 (x964); Stocking & Mueller, supra note 204, at 93.
214. See generally C. KAvesrN & D. TsRuRs, ANTrrrus-r PoLcY 136 (x959); Backman, Joint
Ventures and the Antitrust Laws, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 651 (1965); Bernstein, Joint Ventures in the Light
of Recent Antitrust Developments: Anti-Competitive Joint Ventures, io ANrTmusyr BuLL. 25 (2965);
Hale, Joint Ventures: Collaborative Subsidiaries and the Antitrust Laws, 42 VA. L. REv. 927 (1956).
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under some circumstances, a joint venture can have serious anticompetitive
effects.
The complications of the inquiry as to the competitive effects of a joint
venture appear to defy the formulation of any clear and simple test, even
as to oligopoly markets. At the same time, it seems perfectly apparent that
businessmen must have a relatively clear and speedy method of deter-
mining the probable legality of such a device, for joint ventures are a con-
stantly used and generally accepted business technique.21 Their develop-
ment has been previously encouraged under the umbrella of a considerable
degree of immunity from antitrust litigation 2 "
In its first decision dealing with joint ventures in more than a decade
and its first such decision ever under section 7, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co." ' held a reinvigorated section 7
fully applicable to joint ventures and attempted to relate its determination
on the merits to the problem of controlling oligopoly power. In Penn-Olin
two large producers of chemicals and chemical products (Olin Mathieson
and Pennsalt) formed a joint venture (Penn-Olin) to enter a highly con-
centrated oligopoly market: the production of sodium chlorate (a chemical
bleach used in making paper) for use in the southeastern section of the
United States. The high concentration of this market was reflected in the
fact that, at the time the joint venture was organized, only three companies
in the United States produced sodium chlorate, and only two of these were
favorably situated geographically to serve the relevant southeastern mar-
ket, neither of which included the joint-venture partners. Thus, Pennsalt,
although a major producer in western markets, had no plant in the South-
east and shipped into that territory only a small part of the sodium chlorate
consumed there; Olin Mathieson was not a producer of sodium chlorate at
all, but did have the know-how, resources, and capacity to enter the south-
eastern market. Both companies had considered entering the market singly
prior to formation of the joint venture. 18
The district court found for the defendants on the ground that the
Government had failed to establish that both Pennsalt and Olin Mathieson
would have entered the market separately in the absence of the joint ven-
ture." ' Therefore, injury to competition had not been proved, since the
joint venture would presumably become as effective a competitor in the
new market as would either of its parents.
215. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 169 (1964).
216. What litigation there has been has arisen under the Sherman Act, and the cases decided
by the Supreme Court have all involved various anticompetitive practices in addition to the fact of
the joint venture. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 593 (1951); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. i ('945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383
(i9x2); KAYSEN & TuRNuR, op. cit. supra note 214, at 137; Backman, supra note 214, at 653-55.
217. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
218. Id. at 174-75.
2i9. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 127-30 (D. Del. x963).
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The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the district
court had erred in failing to consider whether there was a reasonable
probability that one of the two parents would have entered the market
"while the other .. remained a significant potential competitor."22
Specifically focusing on the oligopolistic conditions in the sodium chlorate
market, the Court said: "'The existence of an aggressive, well-equipped
and well-financed corporation engaged in the same or related lines of
commerce waiting anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market would be a
substantial incentive to competition which cannot be underestimated: "'2
To support this economic conclusion the Court quoted from a TNEC
monograph:
Potential competition ... as a substitute for [actual competition] ... may re-
strain producers from overcharging those to whom they sell or underpaying those
from whom they buy .... Potential competition, insofar as the threat survives
[as it would here in the absence of Penn-Olin], may compensate in part for the
imperfection characteristic of actual competition in the great majority of com-
petitive markets. 222
In addition, the Court quoted a paragraph from the report of the Attorney
General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws stating the
importance in the maintenance of "effective competition" of preserving
potential market entrants as well as existing competitors.2
The Court's opinion unmistakably indicates that it had the oligopoly
problem well in mind in reaching its decision and, indeed, that this may
have once more been a decisive factor. But the Court gives little hint of
just how the law of joint ventures is to be related to the control of oligopoly
power despite its apparent strong feeling that it should be so related.
Unlike each of the major decisions dealing with oligopoly power dis-
cussed up to this point, Penn-Olin did not formulate or even suggest a sim-
plified test of legality. Instead, it listed a number of criteria which it said
the district court "might" take into account. These include almost every
conceivable factor relevant to a full study of the competitive impact and
market setting of a joint venture, including, for example, "the number and
power of the competitors in the relevant market; ...the competition
existing between [the joint venturers] and the power of each in dealing
with the competitors of the other; the setting in which the joint venture
was created; the reasons and necessities for its existence; .. .an appraisal
220. 378 U.S. at 175-76.
221. Id. at 174.
222. ibid., quoting from C. WLcox, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AmERICMAN INDUSTRY 7-8
(TNEC Monograph No. 21, 2940).
223. Id. at 176, quoting from ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 320 (1955). As an
indication of how far the law has moved since x955 it is interesting to note that this portion of the
Report begins with the specific disclaimer that economic theory "does not provide a standard of
legality under any of the antitrust laws," for "[lI]egal requirements are prescribed by legislatures
and courts, not by economic science." ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L Coamm. ANTITRUST REP. 316 (x955).
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of what the competition in the relevant market would have been if one of
the joint venturers had entered it alone ... ; the effect, in the event of
this occurrence, of the other joint venturer's potential competition"; and
finally--just in case something was left out-"such other factors as might
indicate potential risk to competition in the relevant market."
224
It is immediately apparent that a full exploration of such factors would
involve a court in what Professor Bok has described as "the inscrutable
problems of predicting the effects of a single merger on competition."225
How is it to be determined whether one or both of the parents was a po-
tential competitor "waiting anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market" and
what should be the significance of such a determination? In Penn-Olin
the joint venture almost certainly had the immediate effect of strengthen-
ing competition, at least to some extent, in the highly concentrated south-
eastern sodium chlorate market. It substituted a new producing facility
located in the southeastern market for the relatively minor competition
provided by the long-distance shipments Pennsalt had previously made
from the West. Indeed, within two years the joint venture held 27Y per
cent of the market (in place of Pennsalt's previous 9 per cent)."'
The crucial issue posed by Penn-Olin is whether an immediate gain in
competition is to be sacrificed on a finding of a mere "reasonable prob-
ability" that one of the parents would have entered the market while the
other remained a potential competitor. Such an inquiry requires a deter-
mination of who is a potential competitor together with an attempt to
weigh the benefits of increased actual competition against the loss of po-
tential competition.
The attempt to determine such fundamentally obscure facts in the con-
text of a legal proceeding seems most difficult. Except in the clearest case it
is difficult to know who is in fact a potential entrant to any particular
market."' The identity of such entrants is subject to sudden change with
shifts in economic conditions and management desires."' Suggested tests
for determining the identity of potential entrants in terms of internal cor-
porate intent or even in terms of external recognition of potential en-
trants. 9 tend to mire antitrust proceedings in a prolonged and unsatis-
factory examination of what corporate officials either intended as to them-
selves or understood regarding others. Finally, the significance of loss of
224. 378 U.S. at 176-77.
225. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HAxv. T.
RiV. 226, 296 (296o). As noted earlier, the Court relied on Bok's analysis in this regard in the
Philadelphia Bank case. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (963); note
76 supra and accompanying text.
226. 378 U.S. at 164-65.
227. See text accompanying notes 317-25 infra.
228. Backman, Joint Ventures and the Antitrust Laws, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 65r, 669-70 (x965).
229. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 H-Rv. LI Rav.
1323, 1362-64, r372-79, 1383-85 (1965).
(Vol. i9: Page 285
OLIGOPOLY POWER
any one potential entrant is related to the number of other potential en-
trants,... and hence the latter fact must also be determined.
The essential difficulty in shaping antitrust policy is that a joint venture,
unlike a merger, may have the immediate effect of promoting competition
by adding a new factor to the market even where very large companies are
involved. Moreover, a joint venture may uniquely promote other impor-
tant economic values. It may serve as a vehicle to combine overlapping or
related technologies, supply necessary technical assistance to a firm enter-
ing a new market,"1 make possible the sharing of business risks beyond
the ability of any single firm, 3' enable joint and more effective use of spe-
cialized and scarce managerial talent, 33 ensure sales outlets or supplies of
raw materials for the manufacture of a new product,234 and provide a
means for achieving economies of scale, particularly in research and devel-
opment.!35 All of these advantages can serve to encourage industrial experi-
mentation and may even facilitate the creation of new technologies and in-
dustries, with large gains for the entire economy. Finally, as an alternative
to merger, a joint venture may be clearly preferable. Due to the balance of
power between the co-owners of the venture, the officers of the new entity
may have more independence than would the officers of a wholly owned
subsidiary or division of a single company with consequent benefit to both
competition and individual initiative and responsibility.
On the other hand, the joint venture, at least when it involves oligopoly
firms, seems inferior from a competitive standpoint to the unilateral entry
into the new market of one or both of the parents. The joint venture per-
manently cuts off the possibility that each of the parents would have en-
tered the market, which would have added two more competitors instead
of one. It may facilitate the transfer of oligopoly power existing in one
market into a second market23 (in much the same way as might occur
through vertical integration). The joint venture puts the parents, particu-
larly if they are competitors, in dangerous proximity to discuss and act
jointly on aspects of their business apart from the joint venture and creates
230. See Backman, Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent Antitrust Developments: Joint Ventures
in the Chemical Industry, so ArrnRusr BULL. 7, X1-12 (1965).
231. See id. at 14-15; Hale, supra note 214, at 929.
232. KAYsEN & TutRuER, op. cit. supra note 214, at 136; Hale, supra note 214, at 935 (citing the
development of foreign oil fields).
233. Backman, Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent Antitrust Developments: Joint Ventures in
the Chemical Industry, 2o ANTTRusr BuLL. 7, 8 (x965).
234. Ibid.
235. KAysEN & TuiRER, op. cit. supra note 214, at 236; Backman, Joint Ventures and the Anti-
trust Laws, 4o N.Y.U.L. Rav. 652, 652 (I965). More recently the extent and existence of any sub-
stantial economies of scale in research has been questioned. See Comanor, Research and Technical
Change in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 47 REv. EcoN. & STxrsvics 182, 19o (1965); Scherer, Firm
Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of Patented Inventions, 55 Ams. Ecos. REv. 2097
(2965); Turner, The Antitrust Chief Dissents, Fortune, April 1966, at 114.
236. See KAysaN & TuRaEs, op. cit. supra note 214, at 138.
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an aura of cooperative team spirit which is apt to dampen competitive fires
between the firms involved!" It also creates reciprocal buying opportunities
among the related corporations and their affiliates. A joint venture enter-
ing one market for a beneficial purpose may not always remain confined
to that market or true to its original purpose."' Finally, a corporation
which becomes a parent in several joint ventures may thereby be involved
in a whole network of relationships with competitors and suppliers which
potentially could "blunt" competition in some markets and force anticom-
petitive concessions in others.. with grave implications to antitrust policy.
Considered from the standpoint of a developing legal policy to control
oligopoly power, what comments can be made and what inferences can be
drawn concerning joint ventures? To begin with, it is not clear how im-
portant a factor joint ventures are in the concentration of American indus-
try. Although the Supreme Court mentioned the "spawning of thousands"
of joint ventures, 4 ' a recent examination showed a "minimum" figure of
only fifteen joint ventures among the i,ooo largest manufacturing corpo-
rations. The total joint-venture assets were 9oo million dollars, as compared
with total assets for all i,ooo corporations of 221.3 billion dollars."41 Clearly
the present rate of formation of joint ventures, especially domestic ones,
appears to be much lower than the current rate of industrial mergers."2
However, these facts relating to the number and rate of formation of
joint ventures may not constitute the whole story. For one thing, they fail
to tell us how many large corporations have already come together in
smaller joint ventures in markets crucial to competition. Thus, in the
chemical industry, seventeen of the fifty-four leading corporations in 1958
held interests in one or more joint ventures.2 An earlier FTC study
showed the extent to which the highly concentrated steel industry tied up
one of its basic raw materials, iron ore, through a virtual labyrinth of joint
ventures and joint subsidiaries. 4 The anticompetitive implications of this
situation become apparent in the light of other studies which have identi-
fied as the greatest barrier to new entry into steel production the lack of
access by a would-be entrant to iron ore supplies caused by backward ver-
237. Ibid.
238. See Gesell, Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent Antitrust Developments: joint Ventures
and the Prosecutor, io ANTTRUST BULL. 31, 39 (x965).
239. See ibid.
240. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, x69 (r964).
241. Hearings on Economic Concentration Before Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. x, at 113 (z964) (testimony of Wil-
lard F. Mueller).
242. Recent FTC data show that in x965 there were 72 newly organized joint ventures, of
which only 58 were domestic, while there were x,893 mergers in the same year. FTC Release, Feb.
11, 1966.
243. Brief for Appellant X4, United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. I58 (1964).
244. See FTC, REPORT ON THE CONTROL OF5 IRON ORE FOR THE ANTITRUST SUBcoMMIErE OF
THE HousE CoMmiTTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 82D CONG., 2D Sass., charts I, I1, V, VII, IX, X, XII,
XVI, XVII, XVIII, XX (Comm. Print x952).
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tical integration (largely through joint ventures) of the large steel compa-
nies;... at the same time the iron ore industry has manifested rigid price
leadership.""6 These considerations would seem to point to the need for
more information concerning the prevalence of joint ventures and at the
very least for some sort of industrial census of joint ventures.
Beyond such quantitative considerations, the mode of analysis suggest-
ed by the Court in Penn-Olin is subject to serious deficiencies. Although it
will be suggested below that a superior test for determining potential en-
trants is one that would rest primarily on the nearness of the market to
that of the potential entrant, rather than on subjective criteria, it would
also seem desirable to deemphasize the test of potential competition in the
field of joint ventures insofar as possible. Greater attention should be fo-
cused on the competitive relationship between the parents, the direction of
the joint venture as horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate, the market struc-
ture and degree of concentration of both the parents and the joint venture's
market, and possible reciprocity and similar risks to competition 47 Thus,
to suggest the scope of the problem, if (i) the parents' market is highly
concentrated, (2) at least one of the parents has a significant market share,
and (3) the joint venture is horizontal, then any supposed advantage from
the increase in the number of competitors in the market as a result of the
joint venture seems wholly illusory. Indeed, the most probable result of the
formation of the joint venture would be to add to the already excessive
market share of the parent or parents. It must be assumed that parent and
progeny will not compete, but will work together to extract a joint maxi-
mum return from the market they influence together.
If, on the other hand, a joint venture is vertical and if the parents are
competitors, much will depend upon the relative concentration of the par-
ents' and the joint venture's markets. If the parents' market is highly con-
centrated, both in an absolute sense and in comparison with the joint ven-
ture's market, and if at least one parent has a significant market share, the
effect of the joint venture would appear generally to be damaging to com-
petition on the basis of an analysis similar to that applicable to a vertical
merger from a concentrated market into a less concentrated market." 8 In
one sense a joint venture appears more inimical to competition than indi-
vidual entry by each parent through vertical mergers, for the merger route
would not involve the increased risk of joint action between the parents.
Conversely, and again speaking generally, where the joint venture's mar-
ket is highly concentrated and the parents' market or markets are less con-
245. J. B N, BARnmRs To NEw ComPETIIoN 153-54 (1956).
246. See Hines, Price Determination in the Lake Erie Iron Ore Market, 4' AM. EcoN. REv. 650(1951).
247. See Part IV infra (further discussion of potential competition).
248. See text accompanying notes 144-50, i6a-65 supra.
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centrated, the vertical joint venture may well serve to increase competition
by introducing a new entrant into the highly concentrated market. The
benefits of entry may tend to outweigh any loss of competition in the less
concentrated market.
The conglomerate joint venture, like the conglomerate merger, presents
the greatest policy difficulty. Perhaps the chief danger in conglomerate
joint ventures with respect to the oligopoly problem arises more from the
risk of joint action by competitors in concentrated markets than from any
"loss" of potential competition, for the loss of the potential competition
of the parents in the joint venture's market must be balanced against the
increased actual competition arising from the joint venture."
The possible effects of reciprocal buying arrangements arising from
joint ventures have scarcely been considered. Yet clearly, whether the
joint venture is in the nature of a vertical integration or of conglomerate
diversification, there is a multiplication of opportunities for the joint ven-
ture partners to engage in reciprocal buying through and, more obviously,
with the joint ventures. Examination of reciprocity effects, therefore, is
relevant in determining the section 7 legality of joint ventures, particularly
where oligopoly markets are involved.
A further crucial consideration to my view is the question of a tech-
nological creativity."'0 If a joint venture brings together two technologies
and if it can be shown that neither parent had the technical capacity to
proceed alone, then I would be inclined to permit the joint venture 1
Public policy directed against the growth of oligopoly power must give
way to technological experimentation and industrial creativity even
though additional concentration may be the result. It simply appears to be
a consequence of the ever-increasing swiftness of technological change "2
that the proper combination of resources and talents for a vital new step for-
ward, or for an industrial experiment, may require a joint venture between
firms in highly concentrated markets. Antitrust, and specifically antitrust
policy aimed at controlling oligopoly power, should not attempt to block
such technical interchange and creative innovation, particularly when
there is no direct addition to oligopoly power, but only an indirect and
remote effect. Indeed, when the effect is remote, joint ventures should be
positively encouraged as a more desirable route to realization of these
249. As to the uncertainty of measuring a loss of potential competition against a loss of actual
competition, see Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE Ro. REP. 17244, at 22330-33 (FTC x965); Back-
man, Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent Antitrust Developments: Joint Ventures in the Chemical
Industry, io ArnTusT BuLL. 7, 9-14 (2965); RahI, Applicability of the Clayton Act to Potential
Competition, in SECTIoN op AN-TRusT LAw, ABA, PROCEEDINGS AT THE SPMNG ME&ETING 128, 136
(958).
250. By technological creativity I do not simply mean a modest gain in efficiency, economies of
scale, or innovation, but a significant, creative advance or new combination of technologies.
251. See KAYsEN & TURNER, op. cit. supra note 214, at x39-4o.
252. Calder, The Speed of Change, 21 BuLL. ATOmIC SCEmNTisTs, Dec. x965, at 4-5.
(Vol. i9: Page 285
OLIGOPOLY POWER
benefits than outright merger. This argument becomes even stronger when
it is realized that the clear alternative to private technological advance is
direct government intervention-always the alternative to an effective and
rational antitrust policy.
Apart from the technologically justified joint venture, which should
generally be exempted from antitrust attack, what generalizations are pos-
sible as to the probable and desirable direction of antitrust policy with
respect to joint ventures and oligopoly power? I would suggest tentatively
(and with the hope of promoting further thought and discussion) the
following: Horizontal joint ventures by competitors within their own
market will almost certainly be proscribed in any oligopoly market where
either firm is of substantial size. Vertical joint ventures from oligopoly
markets into nonoligopoly markets will also be scrutinized. They should
probably be considered presumptively illegal where the joint venturers are
themselves in identical or closely related tight oligopoly markets, with the
burden then shifting to the defendants to show that their venture will not
substantially injure competition. Conglomerate joint ventures from oli-
gopoly markets into both oligopoly and nonoligopoly markets will also be
subject to scrutiny, but a careful weighing of the pluses and minuses to
competition will probably be necessary, with particular emphasis on the
risks to competition through joint action between the parents and with
some attention given to the question of potential competition. Joint ven-
tures, whether vertical or conglomerate, from competitive into both oligop-
oly and nonoligopoly markets should probably not be challenged barring
severe reciprocity problems, a widespread pattern of joint ventures threat-
ening to alter the market's structural characteristics, or other unusual
circumstances.
IV. FuTURE DEvELOPlmNT OF A LEGAL POLICY ArIMD AT
CONTROLLING OLIGOPOLY POWER
Assuming the validity of the economic assumption that concentrated
oligopoly markets are inherently anticompetitive, many problems confront
the future development of a realistic and sound antitrust policy aimed at
controlling or regulating oligopoly power. Initially, we must attempt to
ascertain how much change has been accomplished by the Supreme Court.
In the light of changes made, how strong is the need for additional rules to
control oligopoly power? Ought we to embark on a policy of forced decon-
centration of oligopoly markets? Should the use of presumptive rules of il-
legality be continued or extended? If such rules are to be utilized and if we
are attempting to make legal decisions predictable, can the problem of
market definition be simplified? Once the market is defined, how is concen-
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tration within that market to be measured? What is the relationship of po-
tential competition to oligopoly power, and how are we to identify potential
competitors? What is the relationship between conglomerate size and oli-
gopoly power? Finally, what effect will the further development of rules
aimed at oligopoly power have on other prime values, such as economic in-
centive and technological progress? The balance of this Article will explore
these and related questions. Necessarily, the discussion will be less than ex-
haustive and the conclusions tentative.
A. Significance of the Change in the Direction of Antitrust Policy
Made by the Supreme Court
Frequently lost in the tumult of criticism and controversy that has sur-
rounded the decisions of the Supreme Court since Brown Shoe is recogni-
tion of the significance of accomplishing in such a short time a major re-
orientation and updating of antitrust policy.
i. Economic assumptions underlying legal policy.
In its recent decisions the Court has adopted as the foundation of its
antitrust policy a basically sound economic premise upon which both
critics and defenders of the Court seemingly agree: that a horizontal mar-
ket structure which is composed of only a few firms-a concentrated oli-
gopoly-is inherently anticompetitive.25 In practice, such a market may or
may not at any particular point in time behave in an anticompetitive way,
and the firms in the market may or may not therefore be extracting an
.oligopoly return. That is to say, oligopoly market behavior may be les-
sened or even eliminated in structurally oligopolistic markets by such
factors as ease of entry, competition from close substitutes, technological
change, and self-restraint...
Nevertheless, what the Court and economic theorists agree in affirming
is the fundamental assumption that oligopoly markets are essentially differ-
ent from less concentrated markets in that they carry within them the
seeds of anticompetitive behavior. Remove the conditions inhibiting oli-
gopoly behavior in the market and the anticompetitive behavior of the
classical oligopoly can gradually or even quickly reappear. Thus, concen-
trated market structure is necessarily a root cause of oligopoly behavior,
and, of equal importance, it can be easily recognized.
253. See, e.g., Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLum. L. REv.
422 (1965); Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: 1, 65 COLum. L. Rav. 401 (1965); Markham, The
Effectiveness of Clayton Act Section 7, in PERSIECTIVES Oir ANTITRUST POLICY 164 (Phillips ed.
.1965).
254. See KAYsEN & TUMNER, op. cit. supra note 214, at 6o-6i, 75; Kaysen, Comment to Scitov-
sky, Economic Theory and the Measurement of Concentration, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE
POLICY 118 (1955).
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2. Reformulation of legal theory in light of modified
economic assumptions.
It follows logically from these premises that in determining whether a
challenged activity unreasonably restrains trade under the Sherman Act or
threatens to injure competition under the Clayton Act, a prime decisional
factor should become the relationship between the challenged conduct and
oligopoly market structure. Does the challenged conduct tend to create,
maintain, or intensify an oligopoly structure in an economically distin-
guishable industry or market?25 Taken as a whole the major decisions of
the Supreme Court from Brown Shoe onward reveal an increasing ten-
dency to focus on this question, as this Article has attempted to demon-
strate.
This is not to say that an oligopoly market structure in itself violates
any antitrust law. Both the Sherman and Clayton Acts are limited statutes.
They proscribe specific kinds of acts or conduct which injure competition
or restrain trade, or as suggested here, which achieve concentrated oligop-
oly market conditions. And this is as it should be since concentrated oligop-
oly structure does not necessarily mean that the firms in the market will
behave in an anticompetitive way. Oligopoly structure, in other words, is
not a sufficient condition for anticompetitive market behavior. Neverthe-
less, although the law takes no action against the static market structure of
oligopoly, it should recognize the competitive danger which oligopolistic
market structure poses and should act vigorously to prevent its further
growth or consolidation.
This approach differs in vital respects from the traditional per se rules,
such as the flat prohibition against price fixing. There, a particular kind of
market conduct is declared to be so inherently anticompetitive as to be in
and of itself illegal. Here, a market structure which is not in and of itself
illegal is declared to be so conducive to the emergence of anticompetitive
conduct that agreements, mergers, and possibly other acts that tend to
create or maintain such a market structure are held presumptively illegal.
The proof of a per se violation will often be relatively simple since all
that need be established in any usual case is that the defendants carried out
the acts charged. 56 On the other hand, where oligopoly market structure
255. KAYSUrE & TuNER, op. cit. supra note 214, at 95-98, briefly discuss and reject such an
approach as an alternative to forced deconcentration: "The central question to be asked (under this
approach] about any practice . . . is: how does it contribute to sustaining or increasing market
power .. " Id. at 95. Although recognizing the advantages of administrative simplicity and greater
conformity to traditional antitrust standards, Kaysen and Turner view the approach suggested in this
Article as insufficient in view of the fluctuating vigor in antitrust administration and the inability to
correct existing oligopoly situations where dominant firms have entrenched power which they can
maintain without further merger. Id. at 95-96.
256. Per se rules still leave open the possibility of proving that in the particular situation it
would be nonsense to apply a per se rule, but such circumstances will be both exceptional and rare.
See Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. Rav. 1165, 1171-74 (1964); cf.
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is at issue, the proof that certain acts were performed by the defendants
is only a first step. It then must be established, or presumed on some valid
basis, that such acts will lead to an oligopoly market structure. Except in
the case of a significant horizontal merger, the proof is necessarily indirect,
likely to be complicated, and therefore subject to sharp debate. Even where
a presumption is applied, complications in proof cannot be altogether
avoided since thus far in the cases, and as suggested here, the presumption
would be subject to rebuttal.
Another complication of proof is the market definition. In the usual
per se case involving price fixing, there is no problem of market definition
since it is enough to show the fixing of prices of a given article or com-
modity in commerce, whether or not it constitutes a separate market or
submarket. In a case involving oligopoly market structure, however, the
market definition is crucial to the resolution of the key issue to be deter-
mined-the degree of concentration in the market. Thus, definition of the
market in oligopoly cases will often present difficult questions of economic
analysis.
3. Advantages gained by reformulation of legal theory.
On balance, the reformulation of legal theory as to oligopoly has much
to recommend it, despite difficulties in application. First, legal rules can be
constructed which carefully differentiate between market activities in-
volving oligopoly firms and those involving other firms. Although such
rules will be restrictive as to activities by oligopoly firms, they can also
operate to give greater freedom of economic action to nonoligopoly firms.
For example, the operation of rules as to exclusive distribution, vertical
mergers, and joint ventures could become far more permissive as to non-
oligopoly firms. This relaxation might give small firms more effective
weapons to challenge market leaders in oligopoly markets and, in any
eve y-would allow small firms greater freedom to experiment and inno-
vate in their market arrangements-a desirable goal in itself.
Second, a condition of market structure such as oligopoly-unlike com-
petition or other behavioral characteristic-is easily recognized once the
market is defined. This characteristic makes it possible for firms falling
within such a market structure or considering entering into economic rela-
tionships with firms in such a market to identify easily that fact and to be
aware of the consequent risk.
Third, limiting the operation of legal rules to oligopoly firms and mar-
kets makes possible the construction of simplified rules, such as the prima
facie presumptions used in the Philadelphia Bank line of decisions and the
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556 (E.D. Pa. x96o), aff'd per curlam,
365 U.S. 567 (i96r).
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somewhat similar type of tentative rules suggested by Professor Turner in
his recent article on conglomerate mergers."'7 Assuming no increase in
market-definition problems (and there is no reason to suppose there should
be), presumptions lead to greater predictability and easier enforceability.
On the other hand, rules that must be applied to all markets and to all
firms in a market, regardless of size, necessarily involve a greater com-
plexity in application if they are not to raise large risks of injuring the very
competition we wish to preserve.
Fourth, the result of focusing the rules primarily on the market struc-
ture rather than on the exercise of market power, avoids great complexi-
ties. If the rules sought to measure whether or not oligopoly power had
actually been used, questions of efficiency, progressiveness, ease of entry,
effectiveness of substitute competition, and other economic issues involved
would obscure predictability and uniform enforcement. Rules that focus
primarily on market structure, however, avoid such complex issues in the
first instance. On the other hand, by framing the rules as prima fade pre-
sumptions, defendants are given the opportunity to prove, if they can, that
despite oligopoly structure there is no danger to competition based on the
particular market facts.
Finally, the goal of oligopoly market control does not involve the policy
contradiction of attempting at one and the same time to protect both com-
petitive conditions and competitors, the bizarre results of which can be
seen most clearly in Robinson-Patman enforcement. 8 Oligopoly control
equally avoids the wistful quest for a return to the society of the little en-
trepreneur, a bygone age. At the same time, such a policy does preserve
some of the basic objectives that lie behind the preference for the society of
the small entrepreneur. It tends to promote and preserve, insofar as modern
conditions permit, industrial deconcentration and thereby a greater diver-
sification of the centers of economic power and decision-making"
The basic concept of competition as a criterion for antitrust decision
has recently been criticized because it is a process, rather than "an ultimate
desideratum," and the suggestion has been advanced, derived from early
antitrust cases, that in lieu of "competition" the policy objective of anti-
trust ought to be "maximization of wealth or consumer want satisfac-
257. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv.
1313, X386, 1391 (1965). See also note 117 supra (simplified rule suggested by Government in
Von's Grocery).
258. For a discussion of some of the difficulties involved in such dual policy goals, see Note,
72 YALE LJ. 1265, 1278-81 (1963).
259. It would also seem to meet Professor Bork's criticism that an antitrust policy which seeks
to limit undue concentration of economic power has no built-in stopping place short of "grinding
society down to an aggregation of small producers." Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Con-
cept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALF L.J. 775, 8312-32 (x965). The concept of oligopoly
structure, however, does indeed provide a "built-in stopping place" that falls far short of attempting
to turn the clock back to the era of the small producer.
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tion."2 ' The criticism would necessarily apply to a legal policy directed at
control of oligopoly power since it is a derivative of the general policy of
preserving and protecting competition.
To my mind, however, the great value of the concept of competition,
including imperfect competition, lies precisely in the fact that it is an eco-
nomic process and not an end result. It cannot be conclusively demon-
strated that the process has always led to optimum resource allocation;
but neither can it be demonstrated that more direct pursuit of resource al-
location goals will lead to any better resource allocation or maximization
of wealth. One thing appears clear, however: once resource allocation be-
comes the explicit goal of antitrust, an implicit assumption has been made
that public authority (judicial, legislative, or executive) can and should
determine what business decisions will service that goal. This assumption,
if carried to its logical conclusion, could lead to direct Government inter-
vention or supervision with loss of business freedom and initiative and, to
my view, also a loss in optimum resource allocation; it also involves courts
in tasks of economic regulation for which they are ill equipped. Concen-
tration on the process, on the other hand, involves control of only the ex-
cesses that would undermine the process, and preserves maximum freedom
of business action. It is because oligopoly market structure so clearly raises
the threat of undermining the process of competitive market action that it
seems right to oppose its extension or active maintenance.
B. Need for Further Legal Rules To Control Oligopoly Power
The need for further development of legal rules to control oligopoly
power is evidenced by the continued high concentration of much of Ameri-
can industry. It is hardly open to dispute that in many important United
States markets, oligopoly concentration is high. Thus, the one hundred
largest corporations control over thirty per cent of total assets employed in
manufacturing, mining, and distribution, and the identity and relative
ranking of such firms has tended to become more stable over time!" In
one-third of the thirty-nine product classifications having annual ship-
ments in excess of one billion dollars, the four largest firms control at least
fifty per cent of total shipments.282 Indeed, one study concluded that there
are more concentrated than unconcentrated industries in manufacturing
and mining.2
260. Id. at 829-30, 833-39. But see Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, 78 HAtv. L. REv. 1313, 1395 (r965).
261. See Collins & Preston, The Size Structure of the Largest Indtutrial Firms, x9og--1958, 5r
Am. EcoN. Rav. 986, 987-oo (i96i).
262. See BUREAU OF CENSUS REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF
THE SENATE CoMmi-TEE ON THE JUDVICuRY, 87TrH CONG., 2D SEss., CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN MANu-
PAcTURING INDUSTRY 1958, pt. 2, at 466-67 (Comm. Print r962).
263. KAYsEN & TURNER, op. cit. supra note 214, at 4r. Although similar concentration probably
does not exist in the distribution, service, and construction industries, they may be of less economic
importance than the commodity-producing industries. Ibid.
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Recent studies, moreover, have failed to show any slackening in the
rapid pace of corporate acquisitions and mergers. From 1951 to 1963, 216
of the i,ooo largest manufacturing firms merged or were acquired, and as
a result 139 corporations ranking in size from number 5oi to number
i,ooo, representing 27.8 per cent of all the manufacturing firms in this
size category, were acquired."' In 1964 and 1965 both the total number of
all manufacturing firms acquired and the total number of large firms ac-
quired increased."' Whether these figures reflect an overall increase in
concentration or whether they merely show the maintenance of existing
levels of industrial concentration.. does not seem crucial to the conclusion
that the problem of sufficient control and limitation of oligopoly power has
not been solved.
Recent Government efforts to interfere with and regulate pricing in
oligopoly markets reveal what could be viewed as a dangerous accommoda-
tion with oligopoly power. Thus, the Government-inspired rollbacks of
aluminum and copper prices in early 19666 were possible precisely be-
cause the industries involved were concentrated oligopolies; the Govern-
ment had only to influence the chief officers of one or two of the market
leaders in order to control the price level.
Whatever the immediate economic benefits of such government price-
stabilization efforts, they carry with them the clear risk of leading to addi-
tional government intervention in pricing decisions by oligopoly firms and
of leading in the direction of a kind of ad hoc government price control of
oligopoly markets. This in turn could lead to an easy toleration of such
"tamed oligopolists" and a dulling of any governmental effort to change,
or even limit, concentrated oligopoly market power. In a fundamental
sense, government control has always been the implied response to oligop-
oly pricing, for government planning has always been the implied alterna-
tive to workable competition. Our economic system has been built, how-
ever, on the belief that private action in competitive markets is the surer
path to cconomic progress, and that no government planning agency is
likely to be as creative or as energetic as private enterprise impelled by the
profit motive.
Thus, avoidance of the temptation by the federal government to use
oligopoly market power to achieve desired economic objectives supplies a
further reason for developing additional rules and a deeper-based national
264. Hearings on Economic Concentration, supra note 241, at 125 (testimony of W. F. Mueller).
Among the 200 largest manufacturing corporations, 7.5% were acquired during the period i95o to
1963; over the same period, 20.7% of the next 300 largest firms were acquired. Ibid.
265. FTC Release, Feb. ix, 1966. In x965 there were 1,628 full acquisitions of which x,o63 in-
volved manufacturing companies. Ibid.
266. For a conclusion that there has been no long-term increase in total concentration, see Hear-
ings on Economic Concentration, supra note 241, at 224 (testimony of M. A. Adelman).
267. See Burck, Aluminum: The Classic Rollback, Fortune, Feb. 1966, at 107.
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policy against the creation, maintenance, or use (even by government) of
oligopoly power. 6
Further development of the rules is needed also to make legal decisions
more predictable. The development of the law with respect to the relation
between oligopoly power and vertical and conglomerate mergers, joint
ventures, and distributor integration is in a very early stage, and many
difficulties surround formulation of workable rules. There can be little
dispute that greater certainty in business planning is needed than now
exists.
C. Direction of Further Development of Legal Policy Designed
To Control Oligopoly Power
i. Rejection of the policy goal of dissolution.
In law, as in politics, public policy must often be the art of the possible.
For this, as well as for other reasons, I put to one side the proposal that
existing concentrated oligopoly firms be broken up, even where past
growth is due to merger (and therefore the Du Pont-General Motors..8
rule of retroactive section 7 application would be available). Although
there may be an occasional case, such as Du Pont-General Motors, where a
long-standing combination can be dissolved, there would seem to be no
realistic basis for believing that any general attack on existing oligopoly
structure could be mounted or sustained. Du Pont-General Motors itself
was an unusual case, involving control by the fourth largest corporation in
the United States of the second largest.
The truth of these conclusions appears to have been demonstrated by
the recent passage of the Bank Merger Act of 1966!7" That act, in estab-
lishing a special legal framework for testing the legality of bank mergers,
adopted a conclusive presumption to prevent retroactive application of the
antitrust laws to bank mergers. Thus, the act conclusively presumed that
all bank mergers consummated prior to the Philadelphia Bank case in
1963, including those cases actually in litigation in the federal courts at the
time the bill was passed, were not in violation of the antitrust laws (except
section , of the Sherman Act)."' Even more remarkable was the provision
that mergers consummated after Philadelphia Banl, when presumably
every lawyer knew that section 7 applied to bank mergers, and prior to
the enactment of the Bank Merger Act could not be attacked thereafter in
any judicial proceeding (except under section 2 of the Sherman Act)!"
268. It may, of course, be necessary to control prices in times of artificially high economic de-
mand such as war (or limited war).
269. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
270. x2 U.S.C.A. § 1828(c) (Supp. March x966).
271. x2 U.S.C.A. § x828(c) (2) (a) (Supp. March x966).
272. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(c) (2) (b) (Supp. March 1966). Additionally, there was a provision
that mergers consummated after Philadelphia Bank and under governmental attack at the time of
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Although bank mergers have their own peculiar regulatory history, it
nevertheless seems apparent, when it is remembered how liberally oriented
the 89th Congress was, that any large or even moderate scale attack on
existing industrial concentration would run into congressional storm-
waters of imposing magnitude.
In part, this may simply reflect an ambivalence of attitude in United
States antitrust laws. The British writer, Neale, has noted the tendency of
Americans "to take a romantic view of the achievements and efficiency of
large industrial organizations even while they take a suspicious view of
their power.""" Such an attitude has made the remedy of divestiture rare
even in Sherman Act monopoly cases.
Perhaps, more basically, in a nation so thoroughly pragmatic as this
one, there is an understandable reluctance to push an economic theory,
however well founded, to the extreme conclusion of causing drastic re-
arrangements of large sections of American industry, many of them vital
to the nation's defense and to its continued technological leadership in the
world. Moreover, the most articulate exponents of a policy of divestiture
have found, I think inevitably, that it is necessary to include as a part of
the criteria to be considered an investigation into the actual market per-
formance, including the efficiency and progressiveness of the firms in-
volved. "' Among other reasons, this requirement arises from the essential
unfairness of imposing the drastic remedy of divestiture on oligopoly firms
that may in fact have never exercised such power but may--for whatever
cause-have been behaving competitively. The enormous burden of an
inquiry into efficiency and performance and the lack of qualifications of
courts to undertake it have been fully discussed elsewhere? 5 At the very
least, the inquiry would lead to almost total unpredictability as to which
oligopoly firms would be sent to the block. This consequence alone would
cause severe confusion and difficulty in business planning.
On the other hand, an antitrust policy which does not attack the struc-
ture of existing oligopoly firms might allow significantly more economic
freedom to nonoligopoly firms, and thereby could provide a powerful in-
centive toward some amount of voluntary deconcentration and an effective
deterrent against increasing concentration. Such a policy could include
specific action in particular markets where extreme conditions prevailed
and, insofar as legally possible, attacks on entry barriers, on an industry-
wide basis.
enactment were to be determined in accordance with the new criteria under the act. I2 U.S.C.A.
§ i828(c) (2) (c) (Supp. March 1966).
273. A. NEALE, ThE ANTITRUST LAWS O TIlM U.S.A. 436 (196o). See also Kramer, Book Re-
view, 70 YALE L.J. 689, 692-92 (2962).
274. C. KAYsEN & D. TnucR R, A aRusr PoLicy 61-7o (x959).
275. See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HAv.
L. REV. 226, 258-99 (296o); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78
HIARv. L. REv. 1313, 1318 (1965).
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2. Presumptive rules of illegality.
The present trend of decision is toward the development of legal rules
that presume the illegality of a merger or other conduct significantly en-
hancing the market share or market power of oligopoly firms. Such a de-
velopment in general appears to be both sound and essential to reasonable
predictability of business action by firms in oligopoly markets and to ef-
fective enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Presumptions: absolute or rebuttable. That such rules are presumptive
only means that defendants can introduce by way of defense much of the
economic complexity that the rules serve to eliminate from the plaintiff's
case-in-chief. Greater certainty could be achieved by cutting off or limiting
possible defenses, and generally, by making the rules more in the nature of
conclusive presumptions. However, it is no doubt frequently sufficient for
the business executive simply to be able to know whether there is a risk of
antitrust litigation with respect to contemplated action. Such knowledge
alone may be a sufficient deterrent of questionable action.
In any event, despite the greater certainty resulting from absolute pre-
sumptions, I would be reluctant to make the rules more than prima facie.
In view of the diversity of factors that may operate to influence competition
in any one market and the consequent hazards of making any conclusive
generalization about the effects of particular conduct on oligopoly structure
in all markets, or the effects of oligopoly structure, however concentrated,
on market behavior,"' it would seem unwise to eliminate totally the possi-
bility that the defendants may be able to show that the conduct would have
strong procompetitive consequences in a particular case.
Definition of concentrated oligopoly markets and firms. Modification
of the presumptive rules is required, however, in order to differentiate
more carefully as between concentrated oligopolies and loose oligopolies.
Economic studies do not justify a conclusion more sweeping than one that
concentrated oligopoly markets have inherently anticompetitive tenden-
cies. There appears to be no justifiable basis for extending presumptive
rules to situations beyond that of concentrated oligopoly structure, except
in the case of horizontal mergers.7
It is thus necessary to define precisely what will be viewed as a con-
centrated oligopoly market for purposes of application of the presumptive
rules and what size firms within such a market will be subject to such
rules. For clarity of terminology, a market falling within the definition of
concentrated oligopoly-however defined-can be termed a "proscribed
oligopoly market" (although, of course, the proscription would be far
276. See authorities cited note 254 supra.
277. The Government recently suggested a presumptive rule for horizontal mergers in markets
moving significantly in the direction of loose oligopoly. Brief for Appellant, United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (x966).
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from absolute) and a firm within such a market of sufficient size to be sub-
ject to the presumptive rules can be referred to as a "proscribed oligopoly
firm."
At what actual point should the line be drawn between proscribed oli-
gopoly markets and other markets? Considering Bain's study of levels of
profit, a proscribed oligopoly market might well be defined as one in which
the eight largest firms in an industry supply over a period of several years
seventy per cent or more of total output" Firms within such a market
having a significant market share-I would suggest tentatively ten per
cent-would be proscribed oligopoly firms. Necessarily, the exact point at
which the line between concentrated and loose oligopoly markets is drawn
will be somewhat arbitrary," ' and further refinements can no doubt be
developed. But some line must be drawn if predictability is to be obtained.
It can always be urged that there will be injustice to firms that are dose
to the line. Suppose that the eight largest firms control only sixty-five per
cent of the market. How can it be proved that the economic consequences
of this market structure are significantly different from those where the
same eight firms control seventy per cent of the market? In fact, the eco-
nomic consequences of identical market concentration no doubt vary from
industry to industry.8
Yet, is this problem essentially different from that confronted by the
law in many other fields? Is it not the classic question of how far unman-
ageable complexity should be accepted in legal rules in an effort to do jus-
tice in each specific situation? Perceptive commentators have suggested
that in recent times the law has moved too far in the direction of com-
plexity and that overcomplexity may in the end be self-defeating even as
to the objective of doing justice in the specific case.28' The problem is par-
ticularly acute in the antitrust field, where the demand to investigate all
consequences of a market situation may mean in effect nonenforcement of
the antitrust laws 8
It is not necessary, however, that the line be drawn at identical points
as to all types of market activities by oligopoly firms. Where the relation
278. This point seems appropriate because it was at this level of concentration that Bain observed
profit rates appreciably higher than those in less concentrated markets. See J. BAIN, BARIuuRs To Naw
COMPErnroN ax8 (1956); INDusrmA. ORGANIZATION 411-13 (959).
279. In KAYsEN & TuRNER, op. cit. supra note 274, at 72, a concentrated or "tight" oligopoly is
defined as one in which eight or fewer firms supply 5o% or more of the market, with the largest
firm supplying 2o% or more of the market.
28o. In the FTC's view there is "no ascertainable critical point, in terms of the number and size
distribution of sellers in the market" at which competitive behavior becomes oligopolistic, "for every-
thing depends on the psychology of the business planners." Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE RPG. REP.
x6673, at 21558 (FTC 1963), rev'd, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 35 U.S.L. W...
3136 (U.S. Oct. 17, x966) (No. 342).
281. "We need the courage to recognize that there are areas in which it is better that final deci-
sions be promptly reached, even with a somewhat poorer batting average, than that the game last
twenty innings .... " Friendly, Satisfaction, Yes-Complaceny, Nol, 51 A.B.A.J. 715, 718 (x965).
282. See Mason, Market Power and Business Conduct: Some Comments, 46 Am. EcoN. REv.
471, 478 (1956).
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between a questioned practice or activity and oligopoly power is less clear,
a narrower definition of the firms covered by a presumptive rule could be
justified. To illustrate, in the case of a vertical merger a proscribed oligop-
oly market might be defined as one in which not eight but four firms ac-
count for seventy per cent or more of the market and a proscribed oligop-
oly firm might be defined as one accounting for at least twenty per cent of
the market.28 Although the strength of the presumption and the number
of firms to which it applies might vary, it is nevertheless true that pro-
scribed oligopoly firms would be prohibited from doing what other firms
were free to do. Such development would be more or less analogous to the
emergence of special rules restricting what a monopoly firm may do. 8
The reason for the restriction would be the same in each situation: recog-
nition that such firms possess, actually or potentially, superior market
power and must surrender a certain amount of economic freedom. Unlike
monopoly firms, since the oligopoly firms may not in fact have superior
power, the prohibition is not absolute but conditional.
3. Modification of presumptive rules to include
consideration of entry barriers.
Entry barriers bear an important relationship to the question of wheth-
er an oligopoly market structure will lead to undesirable manifestations of
oligopoly power. 5
A case could therefore be made for not applying any presumptive rule
to mergers or other market conduct involving oligopoly firms unless it
could be shown that there were high entry barriers in the market. In sup-
port of such a modification of the presumptive rules it could be urged, first,
that entry barriers are structural characteristics of the market since they
tend to remain relatively stable over substantial periods of time;.8 . second,
that special recognition of entry barriers does not necessarily mean that
such other factors as speed of technological change and closeness of substi-
tutes must also be considered, since the former can provide the basis for
only a hazardous guess regarding future technology and the latter appears
analytically to be a problem of market definition not requiring separate
treatment; 8 and, third, that since entry barriers have been identified8
283. Compare the presumptive rule for vertical mergers suggested by Professor Stigler: when a
firm has 20% or more of an industry's output, its acquisition of more than 5-io% of the output
capacity of an industry from which it buys or to which it sells would be presumptively illegal. Stig-
ler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 176, x83 (1955).
284. See Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 COLum. L. Rav. 930, 935-36
(z962).
285. J. BAIN, BARRIERS To Naw Comps'TTrIoN 203-04 (1956).
286. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL OROrNZATON 237 (2959).
287. Thus, if substitutes are so close as to totally suppress and eliminate the possibility of oli-
gopoly behavior in a given industry, then the particular industry is not a distinct and separate mar-
ket, but is included in some broader market.
288. In his ground-breaking study of entry barriers, Professor Bain identified three basic types
of entry barriers: (i) economies of scale, (2) "absolute cost" advantages of established firms apart
from economies of scale (such as patent or resource control), and (3) product differentiation. Of
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and recognized as an important determinant of whether oligopoly power
in a concentrated market will be used to extract more than a competitive
return, they carry a strong claim for consideration in formulation of any
general or presumptive rules as to oligopoly markets.
There appear to be several convincing reasons why the presumptive
rules should not be modified to incorporate directly an assessment of the
presence of entry barriers. To begin with, direct measurement of the exist-
ence and height of entry barriers is a complex task of economic analysis.
Each market tends to be different," 9 and thus the simplicity and pre-
dictability obtained by use of presumptive rules would be lost if it were
first necessary to determine the height and extent of entry barriers in a
particular market.
Second, it does not follow that because entry barriers are low in a con-
centrated market, they will necessarily remain low in the future, particu-
larly if the oligopoly firms are permitted to add to their existing market
power, for example by merger, contract integration, or increased adver-
tising resulting in high product differentiation.
Third, there is no basis for assuming that where entry barriers are low
increased entry will necessarily be followed by a decrease in concentration.
The net effect instead may only be to induce alternating cycles of new
entry followed by excess capacity and subsequent elimination of such ex-
cess capacity through merger or failure. The result may be increased con-
centration in the long run and periodic returns to oligopoly pricing.290
Thus, the conclusion appears sound that although high entry barriers
may introduce undesirable market behavior, low entry barriers give an in-
sufficient guarantee of long-run competitive behavior to justify exemption
from presumptive rules.
If, notwithstanding the above analysis, it should be desired to give
some consideration to conditions of entry in formulating presumptive
rules, it would seem reasonable to exclude from the operation of the rules
certain market situations in which it appeared that entry barriers were low
and that concentration was decreasing (even though the industry was still
a concentrated oligopoly). Presumptive rules might be held inapplicable
to a concentrated oligopoly market (except in the case of horizontal merg-
er) upon proof of the following facts:
(i) within the last five years several firms had entered the
market;
(2) the new entrants (or some of them) had been able to re-
main in the market and to operate profitably;
these, product differentiation appeared to be the most important barrier to new entry and absolute
cost advantages the least important. J. BAIN, BARRIERS ro NEw CoMPETIIoN 1S-I6, 53-166, 2x6
(1956); INnusrRsi. ORGANIZATION 248-52 (1959).
289. See J. BAIN, INDusTRIAL ORGANIZATION 238 (1959).
290. See J. BArN, INDUSTRrA ORGANIZATION (1959).
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(3) the new entrants had been able to grow, in part by cutting
into the market shares of the existing firms; and
(4) as a result, overall concentration in the market had de-
creased (although it remained a tight oligopoly).
Proof of these requirements would seem to pose no great difficulty, with
the possible exception of the profitability of new entrants. However, this
inquiry should be no more than a gross reference as to whether the en-
trants operate with some modicum of success or whether they are in the
market only because they are willing to lose money. In the latter situation
there can be no conclusion that entry barriers are low. But except where
low entry barriers could be demonstrated in such a manner, I would not
allow them, even under this alternative approach, to modify presumptive
rules as to oligopoly firms.
In short, although entry barriers are relevant to oligopoly behavior and
might be taken into account in a limited way in the application of pre-
sumptive rules, it is oligopoly market structure that appears to be the root
cause of oligopoly behavior. So long as that structure exists, the basic po-
tential for oligopoly behavior must necessarily remain. Accordingly, legal
policy should be reasonably strict in prohibiting increases in the existing
market power of oligopoly firms even where they may be able to demon-
strate to the satisfaction of a court that prior to such increase in market
power entry barriers were low.
4. The problem of defining the market and measuring market shares.
If presumptive rules of illegality are to be applied to oligopoly firms in
concentrated oligopoly markets, the definition of the market as well as the
measurement of the share held by an individual firm within the market
become crucial. As Kaysen and Turner have pointed out, "Without a mini-
mally reasonable definition of markets, criteria based on quantitative shares
become whimsy." '291 As was seen in the analysis of Alcoa-Rome and Con-
tinental Can the choice among alternative market definitions can radically
affect market shares. 9'
Defining the market. Analysis of the problem of market definition
must be related to the purpose legal policy is attempting to achieve. As
related to the purpose of controlling oligopoly power, the objective of
market definition is to identify a distinguishable sector of trade in which
an oligopoly structure could lead to the power to extract more than a com-
petitive return. In other words, the crucial question is whether there is a
sufficient distinction in the product and in the geographical area of opera-
tions under consideration to allow exploitation by a limited number of
29r. KAYsEm & TURNER, op. cit. supra note 274, at r34 (X959).
292. See Tables x and 2 in text accompanying notes 94-95 supra.
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jointly acting firms having a dominant share of sales of that product in
that area. This is a question for factual economic inquiry based upon care-
ful observation and analysis of the particular markets involved. Here at
least we must face unavoidable complexity. Stated generally, the determi-
nation will rest on the degrees of difference in quality, price, use, and
cost."'s The Brown Shoe decision suggested many specific tests that will be
pertinent to such a determination (among others, industry or public recog-
nition, peculiar characteristics and uses, distinct prices, sensitivity to price
changes, and unique production facilities) 9
In identifying an oligopoly market, it would seem clearly improper to
attempt to rest the analysis on the basis of some single test and ignore the
other tests. For example, even though a particular industry has unique
production facilities, if a second industry produces a closely similar product
selling for about the same price with about the same production cost and if
consumers have no preference for the product of one industry, it is mean-
ingless to say that any group of companies in the first industry has oligop-
oly power. Under these circumstances, raising the price for the product of
the first industry will simply have the direct effect of increasing the sales
of the product of the other industry. That is to say, if there is perfect cross-
elasticity of demand and no cost advantage between one industry and
another, there would appear to be no market advantage that jointly acting
firms in either industry could exploit 2 5
On the other hand, if an industry is insulated to any appreciable extent
over any substantial period of time from competition by other industries,
whether because of consumer preference, cost advantage, qualitative dis-
tinctions, or other differences, the industries should be separated for pur-
poses of oligopoly power analysis. As recognized by Judge Learned Hand
long ago in a statement made with respect to monopoly, but which seems
equally true as to oligopoly, a monopoly may be limited, but within such
limits it may be able to extract a monopoly advantage.!"
This analysis may suggest that the definition appropriate for purposes
of identifying an oligopoly market is closer to that typically employed
under the Sherman Act than to some of the exceedingly narrow definitions
recently utilized in section 7 cases." This may well be so. For if the oligop-
oly firms in a hypothesized market are so restricted by competitive substi-
293. See Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HAv. L. REv. 281, 328 (x956).
294. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
295. "[M]arkets are to be defined in terms of the close substitutability of either product (de-
mand) or production facilities (supply), since it is ultimately the degree of substitutability that limits
the exercise of market power .... " United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 283
(1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
296. United States v. Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
297. Compare, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424-26 (2d Cir.
1945) (Sherman Act market of primary aluminum ingot), with Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309
F.2d 223, 225-29 (D.C. Cir. 2962) (Clayton Act market of aluminum florist foil distinct from market
for decorative aluminum foil of same quality and use).
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tutes that they have no power over price, the most serious question imme-
diately arises as to whether an oligopoly market in fact exists.
It does not follow that the views advanced in this Article require aban-
donment for all purposes of the narrow line of commerce and submarket
definitions that have appeared in recent Clayton Act decisions. As Profes-
sor Bok has pointed out, several markets might be constructed as to any
particular business transaction, even under a single statute, depending upon
the economic evils one is attempting to avoid." 8 All that follows is that in
attempting to protect against the possible evils arising from use of oligop-
oly power, it is necessary to use essentially a Sherman Act type of market
definition. For other purposes, other types of market-definition approaches
could be relevant. Thus, assuming for the sake of analysis that for some
purposes antitrust policy seeks to protect potential competitors as such, a
market definition solely in terms of potential competitors, regardless of
other competitive factors, would be justified"
Although market definition will not in every case be a difficult issue, °'
when rules of presumptive illegality are used, it is the most complex eco-
nomic issue to be decided in oligopoly cases. Indeed, we must face the fact
that market-definition complexity is unavoidable if oligopoly power as a
distinct market problem is to be controlled and regulated in any meaning-
ful or rational way.
In its brief in United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,"01 the Government
argued for adoption of a simplified prima fade rule for defining the mar-
ket in horizontal merger cases. The Government suggested that the valid-
ity of a geographical market be presumed upon a showing that (i) "sellers
whose sales are included [in the market] were in fact in competition with
each other," and that (2) "there is reason to believe that sellers whose sales
were not included in the market suffer from some disadvantage in com-
peting with those whose sales were included." ' Although acknowledging
the importance of proper market definition and agreeing that the objective
is to define an area of effective competition, the Government urged that
an exhaustive analysis of market boundaries would lead to confusion in
result and loss of predictability of future decisions. It argued that simplified
market-definition rules are as necessary to successful administration of the
antimerger statute as are simplified rules for determining market shares
298. See Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under the
Clayton Act, 1961 SuPraME COURT Rav. 267, 300-02 & n.99. On the other hand, possible convergence
of Sherman and Clayton Acts market-definition analysis is visible in the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), in which the Court used Clayton Act
cases in defining the market for Sherman Act purposes and explicitly recognized the possibility of
two or more markets and submarkets under the Sherman Act.
299. See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 2265, 1275-77 (1963).
300. See Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 7o HAv. L. REV. 281, 312 (2956).
301. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
302. Brief for Appellant x5-16, 32-35.
[Vol. i9: Page 285
OLIGOPOLY POWER
and that exhaustive market-definition analysis would yield no better re-
sults than a more limited inquiry."'
Contrary to the Government, I think there is a basic and fundamental
difference between presumptions as to market definition and presumptions
as to market share percentages once the market is properly defined. Al-
though we cannot tell in advance at exactly what percentage of concentra-
tion market behavior will become oligopolistic, we know at least that if
market concentration is carried far enough, oligopolistic behavior will at
some point result. In the case of market definition, however, unless con-
centration is identified with an actual market, it cannot be viewed as
necessarily leading to oligopoly behavior. For this reason incorrect market
definition can lead to absurd legal consequences.
Although market definition raises difficult problems, the difficulty is
not of the same order as that encountered in predicting the anticompetitive
effects of a particular merger; for the latter determination is based on pre-
dictions of future behavior, while the former is, or at least should be, based
on past facts, which while they may be obscure and extended over a period
of time, are presumably knowable °0 Such facts are, of course, open to con-
flicting interpretations. Further, although predictability is highly impor-
tant to business planning, business confidence that antitrust is leading to
results that make some rudimentary economic sense is also important in
stimulating voluntary compliance. Such confidence is likely to be eroded
if decisions turn in even a few cases on excessive concentration in non-
existent markets defined with the aid of the Government-sponsored sin-
plified presumptions. Therefore, in the area of market definition, I would
not allow the Government to indulge in a presumption, but would require
that it bear the full burden of proving the existence of a distinct geograph-
ical and product market.
303. Id. at 3o-33.
304. The advantages of dealing with relatively objective facts as to the past dimensions of indus-
tries and markets would be lost, however, if the suggestion of respondents in the recent FTC-General
Foods litigation were adopted. They argued that, in conglomerate merger cases, the court should
attempt to account for future markets in the market definition by including potential substitutes.
General Foods Corp., 3 TRAE Meo. RMP. 17465, at 22722 (FTC 1966) (appeal pending). The
theory urged to support such an inclusion is that in a conglomerate merger case the issue will fre-
quently not be the loss of actual competition, but of potential or future competition, and that there-
fore the potential competition of substitutes ought also to be considered in defining the market.
Such a change in market definition seems highly undesirable, however. The emergence of future
substitute products is at best problematic, especially as the speed of technological change increases.
In any event, such a determination would require the fact-finding agency to engage in speculative
and complex economic prediction as to the shape of future markets. Cases defended by resourceful
counsel would be likely to bog down in a morass of conflicting economic and technological testimony.
To the extent future substitutes are to be considered at all, they should be used to assess the
future competitive effects of the loss of a particular potential competitor, rather than to obscure the
definition of the existing market. As Commissioner Elman suggested in General Foods, loss of a par-
ticular potential competitor may be without significance even in an oligopoly market because it seems
probable that potential substitute products will at a future time expand the market and thus offset
e loss of the potential competitor. Id. at 22747-49 (dissenting opinion). But as a matter of correct
analysis, the definition of the present market should not be confused by expanding it to include
potential substitutes.
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Measuring the market share. A question related to market definition is
the measurement of the market share itself once the market has been iden-
tified. This may superficially appear relatively easy, but actually it can in-
volve large imponderables since the firms to be compared may have differ-
ent product mixes, different degrees of vertical integration, and differing
accounting methods.Y0 5 Indeed, the choice of particular parameters to be
used in comparing the market shares of various firms may also pose prob-
lems. Should such shares be measured with reference to total sales, assets,
value of shipments, value added by manufacture, productive capacity, em-
ployment, or other criteria, or by some combination of these factors ?..
Whatever is to be measured, should it be at one fixed point in time or
should it be over a period of years ?7. If it is to be measured over a period
of years (as seems preferable), should it be based on an average or rolling-
average figure which would give greater weight to the most recent years?
A separate factor to be considered is the change in relative ranking of firms
within an industry. To what extent do the amount and velocity of changes
indicate that an otherwise structurally oligopolistic market is behaving
more competitively,""8 and to what extent should these determinations in-
fluence measurement of market share?
All these considerations can have an important effect on the final com-
puted market share. Moreover, they are complex and raise highly technical
questions of economic analysis and interpretation."5 The problem has
scarcely been recognized in legal decisions. Further work in this area is
clearly needed in relating economic theory and analysis to legal decision-
making, particularly in connection with the development of presumptive
rules of illegality.
5. The relation of potential competition to oligopoly power.
Potential competition has become a key concept in the developing legalpolicy to control oligopoly power," '1 for where a market is concentrated,
the threat of new entry-or potential competition-is thought to be one of
305. See Singer, Census Concentration Data: A Critical Analysis, io ANTrrRUST BumL. 851, 871
(1965).
306. See Fabricant, Kottke & Suits, Comments to Conklin & Goldstein, Census Principles of
Industry and Product Classification, Manufacturing Industries, in BUSINESS CONCENTRAION AND PRIuC
POI..cy 38-40, 42-45, 48-49 (1955); Rosenbluth, Measures of Concentration, in BusiNEss CoCEN-
TRATION AND PRICE POLICY 57-95 (3955)-
307. See Rosenbluth, supra note 3o6, at 92-94.
308. See, e.g., Joskow, Structural Indicia: Rank-Shift Analysis as a Supplement to Concentration
Ratios, 6 ANTITRUST BULL. 9 (396i).
309. See authorities cited note 3o6 supra.
330. See generally Backman, Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent Antitrust Developments: joint
Ventures in the Chemical Industry, in ANTITRUST BuLL. 7, 9-14 (3965); Bock, The Relativity of Eco-
nomic Evidence in Merger Cases-Emerging Decisions Force the Issue, 63 Micm. L. Rnv. 1355 (3965);
Hale & Hale, Potential Competition Under Section 7: The Supreme Court's Crystal Ball, 3964 Su-
PREME COURT REV. 171; Rahl, Applicability of the Clayton Act to Potential Competition, SEoION oF
ANTTRrusr LAw, ABA, PROCEEDINGS AT THE SPRING MEETING 328 (1958); Turner, Conglomerate
Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 H~nv. L. Rev. 1313, 1362-86 (r965).
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the few factors that can inhibit oligopoly behavior.811 At the same time,
the identification of particular potential competitors, except in the most
obvious cases, is fraught with practical difficulty.
Potential competition and oligopoly power. Although the concept of
potential competition has importance in many areas of antitrust, it is in the
conglomerate merger case that the concept comes most vitally into play.
There it has become the chief vehicle for analysis of market-extension and
product-extension mergers (mergers between firms producing the same
product in different geographic markets or a functionally closely related
product in the same geographical market). The reason for this is not diffi-
cult to understand where the relevant market is highly concentrated (as
has generally been true in these cases). For in theory, it is hard to quarrel
with the proposition that where markets are highly concentrated, potential
market entrants should not be permitted to disappear through merger
with leading oligopoly firms already in the market. This becomes par-
ticularly important if antitrust policy is to put aside any attempt forcibly to
break up concentrated oligopoly markets. Then, indeed, potential new
entry is one of the few remaining possibilities by which excessive concen-
tration may in the future be reduced. Even if the potential entrant were
never actually to enter the market, economic analysis suggests that the con-
centrated market is more apt to behave competitively with, rather than
without, the threat of potential entry.
Passing the extremely difficult problem of identifying particular poten-
tial competitors with respect to any market (to be discussed in the next
subsection) what kinds of legal rules as to mergers are appropriate to the
preservation of potential competition? Three preliminary observations can
be made. First, the rules should be aimed primarily at protecting potential
competition in tight oligopoly markets or markets approaching that con-
dition. Second, the rules should recognize that the most serious loss of
potential competition is the loss of a potential competitor where the number
of other potential competitors is small or nonexistent. The difficulty of so
demonstrating appears slightly appalling in any but obvious cases. So much
so, that a strong case could be made for not attempting to establish the
number or identity of other potential competitors (except where it is self-
apparent) despite its relevance. Third, to be effective, legal rules in this
area will have to utilize presumptions since establishing the future effects
of loss of a particular potential competitor in a particular market is an
even greater exercise in obscurity than establishing the effect of loss of an
actual competitor.
31X. See J. BArn, BARIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 2-4, 203-04 (8956); C. Wmcox, CorFT-
TioN AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTrY 7-8 (TNEC Monograph No. 21, 1940) (cited in United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964)).
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In view, however, of the greater remoteness of the effect on competition
caused by a merger resulting in the loss of a potential competitor, as com-
pared to a merger causing loss of an actual competitor, and the relative
lack of knowledge of the total economic effect that would follow from
further drastic restrictions on conglomerate mergers, a stricter definition of
"proscribed oligopoly" could be justified. Thus, for purposes of conglom-
erate mergers involving possible loss of potential competition, a proscribed
oligopoly market might be defined as one in which not eight but perhaps
only six or less firms occupy seventy per cent or more of the market, and a
proscribed oligopoly firm with respect to such market as one which could
be clearly identified as a potential competitor and which seeks to acquire a
firm having at least ten per cent of the market. As experience developed in
dealing with conglomerate mergers and markets and as the effect of the
rules was observed on the growth of horizontal oligopoly, the rate of in-
dustrial mergers, technological progress, and the marketability of control-
ling interests, the definition could be expanded or further contracted.
The differing impact of such an approach can be observed by referring
to the FTC's recent decisions in National Tea Co.312 and General Foods
Corp."' Although the first case was a market-extension and the second a
product-extension merger, each involved a conglomerate merger by a po-
tential market entrant (in the majority view), and each case was decided
adversely to the respondent. However, in National Tea Co. the relevant
local grocery markets in which the acquisitions by National Tea took place
were for the most part not concentrated oligopolies," 4 while in General
Foods Corp. the relevant steel-wool market, which General Foods sought
to enter through merger, was an extremely tight oligopoly. 1' Contrary
presumptions would have been drawn in these two cases under the ap-
proach suggested in this Article. (This might or might not have led to a
different final result since the presumption is, of course, only a starting
point.)
Thus, in general, legal policy would erect a special barrier to conglom-
erate mergers involving a loss of potential competition (through a pre-
sumptive rule) only where (i) the market of the acquired firm was highly
concentrated, (2) the acquiring firm was clearly a potential competitor
with respect to that market, and (3) the acquired firm had some substan-
tial share of the market (for example, ten per cent). The presumption
would be rebuttable to allow a showing by defendants of actual procom-
332. 3 TRADE REG. REP. V 17463 (FTC 1966).
313 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17465 (FTC 1966) (appeal pending).
314. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17463, at 22695-7oo. Moreover, new entry remained relatively easy.
Id. at 22702.
315. Two firms, including the acquired firm, accounted for 98.6% of relevant market. 3 TRADE
REo. REP. x7465, at 22726 (FTC 1966) (appeal pending).
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petitive consequences, increased economic efficiencies, and achivements in
technological innovation. It would be anticipated that the suggested policy
would, as in other cases, operate to give increased freedom of action to
smaller firms seeking to merge into nonproscribed oligopoly markets. 16
Devising an adequate test for potential competition. Because of the im-
portance of potential competition to the above policy, a test for identifying
potential competition must be devised. The difficulty with the concept is
not one of legal theory (provided it is not allowed to confuse the problem
of market definition), but the very practical difficulty of identifying par-
ticular potential competitors with respect to any given market. The prob-
lem deepens when it is realized that under no rational economic analysis
could some of the most significant recent market entrants have been iden-
tified in advance.3 7
The attempt to identify potential competitors can take several possible
approaches. It may proceed in terms of intended potential competitors
(whether or not recognized as such), a"' recognized potential competi-
tors,"1 objectively probable competitors (in the sense that there is a rela-
tionship between their existing and potential markets), 20 or some combi-
nation of these factors. 21
Each of such approaches presents serious practical difficulties. The diffi-
culties involved in attempting to identify intended potential competitors
are graphically illustrated in the recent decision on remand in United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.32 Pursuant to the direction of the Supreme
Court that it should reexamine the evidence that one or the other of the
corporations involved in the challenged joint venture might have entered
the market while the other remained a potential competitor, the district
court delved deeply, and I believe obscurely, into the vagaries of corporate
decision-making.
It is difficult enough for a court to reconstruct the intent of a specific
individual. The determination of what a large corporation acting through
316. A similar approach to conglomerate mergers is developed in much more extensive and re-
fined detail by Turner, who would also concentrate the force of legal policy on mergers into highly
concentrated industries by potential market entrants. See Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. R-v. 1313, 1362-86 (3965). 1 disagree with Turner chiefly in the means
by which I would identify potential competitors and in not making any presumptions conclusive.
317. See Backman, Joint Ventures and the Antitrust Laws, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 65x, 669-7o
(z965).
318. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965) (remand).
319. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HtAv. L. Rav.
1333,1362-64, 1378 (3965).
320. See Backman, Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent Antitrust Developments: Joint Ventures
in the Chemical Industry, 3o AmTRusT BULL. 7, 13 (z965); Hale & Hale, Potential Competition
Under Section 7: The Supreme Court's Crystal Ball, 1964 SUPREME CoURT REv. 171, i8x; Turner,
Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 -Ixv. L. REv. 1313, 1384 (x965).
321. See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas CO., 376 U.S. 651, 66o (x964). Factors listed in-
cluded "the nature or extent of [the] . . . market," "the nearness of the absorbed company to it,"
"that company's eagerness to enter that market," and its "resourcefulness."
322. 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 3965).
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staff agencies, committees, officers, and directors intends to do-not merely
in the present, but at some future time as well-involves the proceedings
in a vast labyrinth of evidence. "' Further, once the legal issues are known
to astute corporate counsel, future facts as to corporate intent can be ex-
pected to be shaped under careful legal guidance to negate any inference
that a corporation intended to enter any particular market which it later
enters by merger. A rule which would treat the corporation that is actively
exploring market entry and expansion differently than its more dormant
competitor would seem to be penalizing the very innovation and creative
planning in business that ought to be encouraged.
The attempt to identify potential competitors in terms of which firms
are "recognized" as such involves similar problems. Except in the most ob-
vious case, such as in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co."4 where the
potential competitor had actively and publicly sought to enter the market,
the court must again deal with a question of corporate intent and state of
mind. The test based on recognized potential competitors has the advan-
tage of being a question of present state of mind and understanding which
is unaffected by what in fact the potential entrant intends to do in the fu-
ture or has the capacity to do. It has the disadvantage, however, of requir-
ing the ascertainment of the corporate understanding, not of one company
alone, but of several separate firms. There is in addition the risk that such
a rule would tend to encourage secrecy and obscuring of motives and ac-
tions on the part of possible market entrants. This consequence would be
most undesirable since hiding the motives and actions of possible entrants
removes the visible threat of entry which, as previously indicated, may be
the most potent force in restraining oligopolistic behavior. A further dis-
advantage of the test of recognized potential competitors is that it also gives
an incentive to create facts. In this instance the motivation would be differ-
ent-the desire of existing firms in a market to exclude from entry by
merger a firm whose competition they may wish to avoid once merger
plans are announced or suspected.
The objectively probable test for a potential competitor is based on near-
ness of the product and geographical markets, funds available for expan-
sion, technical know-how, past history of market expansion, and related fac-
tors. It also raises problems, as it could involve the court in a most difficult
task of economic and business analysis. Nevertheless, it appears clearly
323. It is a fiction to imagine that a corporation is controlled by a single group will; indeed, "the
operations of a large corporation cover such a wide area and are so complex that they present problems
. . . far beyond the technical scope and comprehension of any one human intelligence." Conflicting
pressure groups struggle to influence corporate decisions and multiple objectives "press for priority
of recognition." Timberg, Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social and International Implications, 46
COLUm. L. REV. 533, 559 (1946); See DiMox & HYDE, BUsaAucRAcy AND TRusTEESHp IN LARGn
CORPORATIONS 25-26 (TNEC Monograph No. '1, 1940).
324. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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preferable to tests of corporate intent and understanding. At least the anal-
ysis would center on past facts of a more or less objective nature, rather
than corporate intent and understanding as to future action.
As related to entry by merger into concentrated oligopoly markets, the
problem might be further simplified by a presumption. For example, it
might be presumed that any firm producing the same product in a differ-
ent geographical market or a functionally closely related product in the
same geographical market, as well as any firm that had publicly announced
its intention to enter a market (the El Paso situation), was a potential com-
petitor. The burden would then shift to the defendant to show by objec-
tive facts that this was not so. The defendant might prove, for example,
lack of available funds or technical know-how or other incapacity preclud-
ing his market entry. The presumption, therefore, would cover basically
the so-called market-extension and product-extension mergers," 5 and the
self-announced market entrant. In all other cases the burden would rest
solely on the Government to prove by relatively objective facts that a de-
fendant was a potential competitor.
Protecting potential competition by lowering entry barriers. The diffi-
culty of determining which firms are potential competitors in a particular
market could be avoided if legal policy, instead of focusing on preserving
existing potential competitors, would concentrate on lowering entry bar-
riers in concentrated markets. As we have already seen, new entry-or the
possibility thereof--can modify oligopoly behavior even in concentrated
markets.32 At the same time, the recent economic studies of Professor Bain
have shown high barriers to new entry in many concentrated industries.2
Product differentiation appears to be the most crucial barrier." 8 In general,
entry barriers tend to be structural (or permanent) characteristics of many
concentrated markets. 29
If such barriers could be lowered and kept lowered, one might expect
that the industry would perform better, and perhaps eventually become
less concentrated as new entrants were attracted. 3 Yet a legal policy of
lowering entry barriers, though desirable in principle, also presents prac-
tical and other difficulties.
First, the particular barriers that are most potent in any industry must
be discovered through careful investigation because they vary greatly.3 1
325. See Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRAIu, REG. REP. x6673, at 21558 (FTC 1963), rev'd, 358
F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3136 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2966) (No. 342).
326. See notes 254, 285 supra and accompanying text.
327. See ibid.
328. J. BAIN, INDUSTRiAL ORGANIZATION 249-61 (2959); BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 216
(1956).
329. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 237 (959).
330. Lowering of entry barriers is not a proper substitute for a policy proscribing mergers involv-
ing loss of actual competition. See notes 289-90 supra and accompanying text.
331. J. BAItN, IDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 238 (2959).
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Thus, Bain found in a study of entry barriers in twenty industries that in
the steel industry forward integration (largely through joint ventures) into
iron ore was a potent barrier and that in the gypsum industry patent block-
age had been important. In the liquor industry, on the other hand, the cru-
cial entry barriers were product differentiation and high capital require-
ments.
Second, once the barriers are discovered, both effective and authorized
legal action must be taken. But it will frequently be true that the legal
action that would be effective is not authorized, and that authorized action
is not effective. Thus, as a general proposition, one might agree that it
would be desirable to lower product-differentiation barriers. Yet, the means
of accomplishing this objective do not appear to be at hand. Such barriers
rest most importantly on advertising, and it is unclear how advertising ex-
penditures can be decisively altered except by direct limitations on adver-
tising activities of firms in concentrated industries where product differen-
tiation is high.33' Moreover, such limitations would have to be discrimina-
tory in character to allow advertising by new market entrants attempting
to establish new brands against the resistance of accepted brands. More
feasible, although probably less effective, would be restrictions on distribu-
tor integration through ownership or contract and mandatory grade label-
ing, which has been suggested as means for making consumers less brand-
conscious."3 4
There would seem to be a greater possibility of directly affecting entry
barriers by the removal of absolute cost advantages of existing firms, such
as patent blockage and control of strategic raw materials in those cases
where a basis for antitrust jurisdiction could be established, and by direct
assistance to small business to remove capital advantages. At the same time,
however, Bain's study showed these to be the least important of the three
types of barriers."
It seems probable that the protection and promotion of potential com-
petition by lowering entry barriers will have to proceed, if at all, by the
slow and burdensome route of market-by-market analyses. Here industry-
wide studies in depth by the FTC, as Commissioner Elman has suggest-
ed," ' might have their most appropriate use. There would be no assur-
332. Id. at 256-60.
333. But see Turner, Advertising and Competition, 26 FED. B.J. 93 (x966), where it is suggested
that limitations be placed on promotional expenses in Sherman Act decrees in order to restore com-
petitive conditions in cases involving findings of excessive market power. Turner also suggests active
Government policy to secure to consumers disinterested advice on the relative merits of consumer
products and thereby to offset some of the effects of the massive advertising that causes high product
differentiation. Id. at 97; accord, Auerbach, Quality Standards, Informative Labeling and Grade La-
beling as Guides to Consumer Buying, 14 L. & CoNaTEM. PRoB. 362 (1949).
334. J. B~iaN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 217 (I956).
335. Id. at 155-56.
336. See National Tea Co., 3 TRADE REo. Rvp. 57463, at 22712-13 (FTC 1966) (dissenting
opinion); Elman, The Need for Certainty and Predictability in the Application of the Merger Law,
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ance, however, that, once identified, such entry barriers could be effectively
removed.
6. The uncertain relation of conglomerate size to oligopoly power.
A firm has conglomerate size relative to other firms as a result of a com-
bination of functions and operations which do not give it significant hori-
zontal power in any market and which are not vertically related. Within
the scope of this Article, it is pertinent to inquire whether there is any re-
lationship between mere conglomerate size and oligopoly power, and what
if anything antitrust policy should do about it. I have defined a conglom-
erate firm as one not having significant market power in any market. A
closely related problem exists where a firm that does have horizonal mar-
ket power in at least one market seeks to grow through conglomerate ac-
quisitions. Excluded from consideration in this section are the undesirable
aspects of conglomerate mergers resulting from a loss of potential compe-
tition (market- and product-extension mergers), which have been discussed
in the preceding section.
Conglomerate size has been attacked both negatively and positively.
Thus, employing a negative attack, Professor Walter Adams asserted that
precisely because of the lack of relation among its functions, the large con-
glomerate firm cannot justify its existence by achievement of any efficien-
cies or economies of scale 3 At the same time, both Professor Adams and
Professor Corwin Edwards have attacked conglomerates on the basis of
positive evils resulting from undue market advantages accruing to the large
conglomerate. These have been thought to include the ability to outspend
rivals, the power of reprisal in the same or a different market, the power
to become self-sufficient as to any particular input through vertical integra-
tion, the ability to engage in reciprocity, "freedom" to allocate costs from
less profitable to more profitable activities and thus to "immunize" itself
from market discipline in particular markets, more favorable access to
credit (prime rate), and nonmarket advantages such as greater political
strength and ability to support protracted litigation."' Furthermore, where
the conglomerate has market power in one market, it may be able to utilize
such power to gain advantages in another market by such means as tie-in
sales and reciprocal buying pressuresY9 In addition, though it may or may
not be a market advantage, it is claimed that the growth of conglomerates
40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 613, 618-2o (3965); Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's Enforcement of the
Merger Law, 78 HtAv. L. REV. 385, 389-90 (3964).
337. Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 249, 252 (z964).
338. See id. at 253; Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in BUSINEss CON.
CENTRATION AND PRIcE POLICY 331-51 (1955).
339. Id. at 340-45.
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decreases the number of people who exercise decision-making in busi-
ness.
840
Assuming that some or all of these advantages may exist for firms of
conglomerate size, is there any relationship between them and oligopoly
power? It has been suggested that close analysis would reveal that all of
these claimed advantages, to the extent they actually exist, are based either
on the leverage of monopoly or oligopoly power or simply reflect superior
341efficiencies of scale or large size.
Thus, it can be urged that predatory price cutting by a conglomerate in
one market may imply the ability to charge a monopoly or oligopoly price
either in that market at some later time, or in another market at the same
time, since it is not rational economic behavior willingly to lose money
without opportunity to recoup. The FTC majority thought it detected such
a pattern of predatory price cutting and subsequent recoupment by a con-
glomerate with differing market shares in various regional markets in
National Tea Co. It found that while respondent grocery chain engaged
in below-cost selling in 141 cities where it held less than ten per cent of the
local food market, in other cities where it had larger market shares (thirty-
five per cent and over) there was a "striking correlation" between the
larger market position and increased profitability. The difference in return
was unrelated to the sales volume in a particular city."'
On the other hand, some of the claimed advantages of conglomerates
may be no more than efficiencies inherent in scale. Thus, a company that
is large enough to utilize a computer efficiently may achieve advantages
over noncomputerized rivals that have equal or larger shares of one par-
ticular market."' That kind of advantage clearly does not involve oligop-
oly power and is probably not objectionable on any grounds.
The plain fact that emerges from an attempt to analyze the relationship
between conglomerate size and oligopoly power-when we put to one side
the special situation of potential entrants into oligopoly markets-is that
very little is known. This suggests that public policy should move slowly
in this area in prohibiting or restricting activities by conglomerates.
At the same time, it would appear highly desirable to learn more about
the activities of conglomerates. For the very reason that the conglomerate
firm is engaged in many seemingly unrelated activities, the published fig-
ures as to such firms reveal far less about their business operations than the
340. Id. at 351.
341. See Stocking, Comment on Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in Busi-
NESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 352-59 (1955).
342. National Tea Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17463, at 22700-os (FTC i966).
343. Computer manufacturers have recently testified, however, that computers are becoming
readily available to smaller companies through leasing and sharing programs. Hearings on Economic
Concentration Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 89 th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 4, at 157-8i (x965).
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figures of less diversified firms. It simply cannot be determined in many
cases whether a conglomerate is "subsidizing" below-cost selling in one
product by high profits in another (this practice should not necessarily be
condemned, but it should be known). It would seem desirable, therefore,
for there to be new legislation in this area in the nature of a "Conglomerate
Disclosure Act." Pursuant to the provisions of such an act, each conglom-
erate firm larger than a certain size (perhaps ioo million dollars in annual
sales) might be required to disclose or publish annually an operating state-
ment for each product line, showing (i) net sales, (2) cost of goods sold
(itemized to show individually the cost of goods purchased from affiliates,
the cost of goods purchased from outside firms, and labor costs), (3) oper-
ating overhead, (4) net profit or loss from such product line, and (5) area
of geographical operations. 44
The need for additional information about conglomerates seems par-
ticularly crucial in view of the growing tendency for mergers to take the
conglomerate route as antitrust policy raises higher obstacles to horizontal
and vertical mergers. Further, aside from the ordinary mixture of motives
that leads to corporate diversification, there is a special incentive for con-
glomerate merger to a company identified in the public mind as being in
a "glamour industry." Such a company is apt to enjoy a high price-earn-
ings ratio on its stock. By acquiring more mundane firms with high earn-
ings potentials, it may be able at one and the same time to raise earnings
and stock values without adversely affecting the company's price-earnings
multiplier. For all these reasons more information about conglomerates
appears highly desirable.
7. The encouragement of economic incentive and
technological innovation.
The encouragement of economic incentive and technical innovation are
keystones of our free enterprise system. If the results of an antitrust policy
were to discourage economic incentive or technical innovation, dearly the
policy would have miscarried. The use of simplified rules of illegality to con-
trol oligopoly power raises some risks in these directions.
Economic incentive. Concern has been voiced by supporters of vigorous
antitrust that if antimerger enforcement is carried too far it will have an
344. Such an approach is similar to Senator Long's bill to require annual disclosure and re-
porting by firms engaged in dual distribution. S. 1843, 89th Cong., ist Sess. (1965). It is also specifi-
cally recommended in the recent report of the National Commission on Food Marketing, "We also
believe that the diverse activities of conglomerate and integrated firms will be less likely to be con-
tary to fair competition if information is made publicly available about their operations in the vari-
ous fields in which they do business." The Commission recommended annual public reports to the
Securities and Exchange Commission of sales, expenses, and profits for all public corporations having
yearly sales in excess of a specified amount both for conglomerates and vertically integrated firms.
U.S. NATIONAL CozaussoN ON FOOD MARKETING, REPORT, FOOD FROM FARMER TO CoNSUMER xo6-
o7 (1966).
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inhibiting effect on economic incentive in that it will tend to destroy the
market for capital assets34 Put another way, if exit is made too difficult,
entry may be discouraged because of the frequent desire of owners of
smaller firms, or their heirs, to sell businesses in order to realize the capi-
tal gain they have built up."4 6 However, it would appear that such an in-
hibiting effect has not yet occurred." '
The question is then raised as to whether the suggested rules discussed
in this Article will have such an incentive-reducing effect. They would no
doubt tend to block mergers by "proscribed" oligopoly firms. However, at
the same time, the proposed policy would make for greater freedom in
mergers by other firms, particularly in the case of nonhorizontal mergers.
The proposed policy would also lead to greater competitive freedom for
nonoligopoly firms in contract integration, and possibly other areas, and
thereby might facilitate faster growth of such firms. These advantages
might in turn provide a powerful incentive to smaller firms, offsetting any
loss of incentive from reduced marketability of controlling interests.
A policy alternative that would make the problem of exit less acute
would be a further lowering of individual income tax rates to permit the
entrepreneur more easily to withdraw his profits through salary and divi-
dends. To some extent, indeed, the "wave of mergers" about which Gov-
ernment authorities express such continuing concern may be, at least on
the seller's side, largely the natural and obvious reaction to tax policies un-
duly favoring the sale of businesses by a successful entrepreneur.
Technological innovation. A fundamental premise behind our antitrust
laws would appear to be a belief in the value and fruitfulness of permitting
free experimentation in business endeavor. Free experimentation may be a
higher value than the prevention of concentrated oligopoly markets in the
limited cases in which the two goals conflict. Specifically, it has been urged
above that vertical mergers and joint ventures which can be adequately
justified on grounds of technological experimentation and creativity be
permitted in spite of possible market concentration risks. ' A good deal
more than mere economies of scale or increased efficiency is involved. A
possible example of a combination which could be justified as promoting
innovation might be the recent union of the technologies of electronics and
book publishing to create a new industry and technology of programed
education4 (assuming, as it would superficially appear, that neither indus-
345. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv.
1313, 37 (1965).
346. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNm, ANTIRST POLICY 127-28 (1959).
347. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv.
133, 1394 (1965). See also NArIoNA. EcoN omIcs RS ARcH Asssoe iAs, T-mE ANTrrsus'r CLLATE:
MERGERS (1966) (questionnaire survey of xoo large companies showed i8o mergers in last 5 years).
348. See notes 250-52 supra and accompanying text.
349. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1966, § 3 (Financial), at 1, col. 5.
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try alone possessed the technical resources or know-how to create the new
technology).
A distinguished antitrust scholar has recently argued against making
technological innovation a standard for decision in antitrust cases, in part
because no "meaningful criteria" exist by which a court can decide how
much competition to sacrifice in order to promote a particular innova-
tionY" There is merit to this argument if a court were to be required to
balance precisely the loss of competition against the expected values to be
gained from a particular technological innovation. However, if one begins
with the assumption that antitrust, or at least antitrust policy directed
against further growth of oligopoly power, ought not to bar technological
progress not otherwise obtainable, such extensive balancing is not required.
The court would still have to determine whether a particular merger
or joint venture involved some element of creative innovation and whether
the innovation could be obtained by a less restrictive practice or method,
but once these facts are established it would not be necessary to weigh
the value of the innovation against the loss of competition. It would simply
be presumed that the innovation should be permitted. Such a rule would
seem reasonable in view of the fact that we are, except in the case of hori-
zontal mergers and joint ventures, not talking about a direct horizontal
addition to market power, but at most an indirect effect upon competition
and market concentration.
There is no avoiding the fact, however, that in ruling on questions of
technological innovation, courts would be required to enter an area where
they are likely to have little experience and no special competence. There
appears no way of averting such an inquiry. The most that can be done,
therefore, is to simplify the court's task insofar as possible by not requiring
more than a judicial determination that an innovation is present and that
it has substantial value.
An additional means of simplifying the problem would be to encourage
joint ventures in lieu of mergers as the preferred method of combining
technical skills and know-how. The joint venture appears to be a sufficient
business device for bringing together new combinations of technology in
many, if not most, cases and seems generally a superior alternative to
merger for the reasons discussed earlier.!51 Channeling developments in
the direction of the joint venture would permit a limitation on the assets
and functions to be combined in the new undertaking to those that were
necessary to achieve the particular innovation.
The strong recognition of the goal of fostering technological advance
as recommended here seems fully adequate to prevent a policy of control-
350. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74
YALE L.J. 775, 832 (1965).
351. See notes 214-52 supra and accompanying text.
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ling oligopoly power, although vigorously applied, from imposing on in-
dustrial experimentation and innovation. In fact, the risk is probably in
the other direction-the possibility that these defenses might become loop-
holes for escaping antitrust sanctions. Yet such a risk seems worth taking
given the present velocity of economic and technological change, the im-
portance to our national welfare of leadership in such change, and a cer-
tain amount of humility concerning the belief that any single method of
industrial organization (even one based on free competition) will always
be adequate to achieve optimum innovation. 52 Although the showing of
innovation would have to be clear, it would seem unwise, and probably
even foolish, to carry the principle of limitation of oligopoly power and
promotion of competition so far as to preclude or substantially retard the
development of new combinations of technology and the creative industrial
evolution.
CONCLUSION
With growing uniformity economic theory has identified the concen-
trated oligopoly market as being inherently anticompetitive. Although the
courts neglected this economic view until 1962, the decisions of the Su-
preme Court since that year have with increasing clarity reflected the rec-
ognition of oligopoly theory as an economic premise for legal reasoning.
As a result, rules of law appear to be emerging that focus on concentrated
oligopoly markets as objects of particular antitrust concern. This has been
similar to the earlier focus on monopoly markets.
This development has posed difficult questions for judicial administra-
tion in view of the necessary limitations of the judicial process in dealing
with complex economic facts and in view of the need for maximum cer-
tainty in business planning. These considerations require simplification of
legal rules with respect to oligopoly power insofar as possible. Analysis in-
dicates possibilities for further extension of presumptive rules of illegality
of the type employed in Philadelphia Bank. Despite such possible simpli-
fications, at least three areas of unavoidable economic complexity remain:
(i) definition of the market, (2) identification of potential competition,
and (3) recognition of possibilities of technological innovations. The for-
mulation and development of an explicit legal policy toward oligopoly
power represents no change in underlying antitrust values, however, but
only a more effective means to the achievement of such values. The ulti-
mate goal of antitrust remains the preservation, to the greatest extent pos-
sible, of the conditions of open competition and free economic experi-
mentation.
352. The policy could of course be reviewed periodically (with the benefit of hindsight) to de-
termine whether it had indeed become an escape hatch or was otherwise not effective.
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